THE LIE OF APARTHEID

and other true stories from Southern Africa



Arthur Kemp


THE
LIE OF
APARTHEID
and other true stories from
Southern Africa
Arthur Kemp

The Lie of Apartheid
And Other True Stories from Southern Africa

Arthur Kemp B.A. (Pol. Sci., Intl,. Pol. Pub. Ad.)
Ostara Publications

The Lie of Apartheid and Other True Stories from Southern Africa
Arthur Kemp
Ostara Publications
www.ostarapublications.com

Contents

The Lie of Apartheid
The Myth of Mahatma Gandhi
The Puzzle of Autogenocide
How the Mighty Fall
When the River Ran Red
When the West Looked Away: White Genocide in Zimbabwe
Interviewed by the Flemish
Conspiracies and the Chris Hani Assassination

ES SAY ONE

The Lie of Apartheid

It is one of the many bitter ironies about South Africa that the policy of apartheid—to which Afrikaners clung for decades as their only hope and salvation from Third World domination—was in fact an impracticable and unworkable system which led directly to the Afrikaners' demise as a political force in that country.

The politicians—the National Party—who fostered apartheid are the primary criminals in this tragedy, holding out a false illusory hope to the Afrikaners, and then when the inevitable became just that, changed track and gave in, abandoning their followers to African National Congress (ANC) rule as callously as they had earlier lied to them.

For apartheid—in reality forced social segregation—was nothing but an illusion, a twisted distortion of the demographic reality of South Africa, not to mention the truth that it was ultimately, morally repugnant as well. The conservative white South African politicians never understood what the driving force of political power is: namely, physical occupation. Political power comes from physical occupation: not historical rights, not title deeds, not moral rights—only occupation. *Those people who occupy a territory determine the nature of the society in that region.*

The madness of apartheid: segregated toilets, but blacks would be the ones to clean the facilities. This gave rise to the common joke about the black cleaner washing the floor in an Afrikaner church. The reverend told him that he would be fired if he caught the cleaner praying while he was on his hands and knees. The tellers of that "joke" seldom considered the truth which lay behind it.

Two examples, familiar to all, illustrate this point well:

* Example 1: North America. On that continent, the American Indian (Amerind) people lived for thousands of years, creating a culture which dominated that continent. The culture of North America reflected the fact that the Amerinds lived and formed the majority population there.

After 1500 AD, however, that continent filled up with white immigrants from Europe. These white immigrants displaced the Amerinds by squeezing them out of

possession of North America. The Amerind culture had dominated for thousands of years, because they were the majority population. Within one hundred years, this had changed. This shift reflected the fact that the majority of inhabitants of North America had become white Europeans. The Amerind civilization “fell” because the population of North America changed.

This effect—the displacement of peoples and the subsequent disappearance of their civilization—has direct implications in racial terms. The rise and fall of any particular civilization can therefore be traced, not by the economics, politics, morals, etc., of a particular civilization, but rather by the actual racial presence of the people themselves.

If the society which has produced a particular civilization stays intact as a racially homogeneous unit, then that civilization remains active. If, however, the society within any particular given area changes its racial makeup—through invasion, immigration, or any decline in numbers—then the civilization which that society has produced will disappear with them, to be replaced by a new civilization reflecting the new inhabitants of that territory.

* Example 2: Israel. The state of Israel is today a political reality, not because the Bible says Jews belong there (although many Jews and Christians might think so) but simply because the Zionist movement has ensured that Jews are a majority in that territory. This was done through a deliberate policy of settlement and immigration, coordinated over decades.

This also forms the rationale behind the current Israeli government’s plans to build up Jewish settlements in the West Bank: by physically occupying the territory, they hope to change the makeup of that region to the point where it becomes de facto part of Israel.

History teaches us that there are two main reasons for a change in the racial makeup of any society: either military occupation, or the use of alien labor. The American Indians serve as a textbook example of the “military occupation” case study, as detailed above, while South Africa serves as a textbook example of the “use of alien labor” case study. When a change occurs through the use of alien labor, the following process occurs:

- The dominant society imports (usually racially) foreign labor to do the menial work in that society.

- These racial aliens then become established, and settle down and multiply in numbers by drawing upon the society’s structures (in white countries, their science, healthcare, technology, etc.).

- They finally dominate that society by their sheer numbers.

It is, simply put, a demographic reality: those who occupy a land determine the nature of that society. And so it was—and is—with South Africa, where population figures reveal precisely how the use of alien labor by the Afrikaners dispossessed them of their fatherland.



The black "homelands" in apartheid South Africa. Astonishingly, the apartheid government expected 85 percent of the population to be happy with a dispensation which allocated them 13 percent of the land surface — while the blacks did almost every scrap of labor throughout the entire country.

Consider the following: in 1904, the first population census of the old Transvaal revealed that there were 297,277 whites, and 937,127 nonwhites in that region (*Transvaal*, 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica).

Importantly, the 1904 census also tells us that of these nonwhites, some 135,042 were not from the Transvaal, and were only in the "Witwatersrand to work in the gold and other mines," and that only 77 percent of all blacks in the Transvaal in 1904 were actually born there (Ibid.).

With transient migrant laborers removed from the equation, this means that there were 297,277 whites and 802,085 locally born blacks in the Transvaal.

According to the 1960 census, the population of the Transvaal numbered 6,225,052, of which only 1,455,372 were whites (*Transvaal* , Encyclopedia Britannica, 1966, Volume 22, page 423).

These were only the figures for the Transvaal, it needs to be noted. For the entire country, the figures were even more frightening: 4.5 million whites to anywhere between 30 and 35 million nonwhites.

What caused this population imbalance to swing from 802,000 blacks in the Boer homeland in 1904, to 4,769,680 in 1960—just fifty-six years? The answer: the

blacks multiplied because they were drawn to the Transvaal by the offer of work. Once settled there, they used the benefits of white society (healthcare, technology, etc.) to exponentially increase their numbers.

The formalization of apartheid by the National Party after 1948 did not address the real issue which has faced every minority trying to rule over a majority country throughout history. This inherent contradiction of allowing huge numbers of racial aliens into a territory whilst trying to prevent that majority population from dominating that society has never been solved.

The truth is that it cannot be done.

In South Africa, almost every white household had (and still has) one or more black servants.

Afrikaner farmers—who are subject to a viciously high rate of attacks and murders—generally have hundreds of black laborers working their huge farmlands.

In the mines, the economic heart of the country, the vast majority of common laborers, numbering many hundreds of thousands, are black.

All over the country the overwhelming majority of laborers doing almost everything, from factory work to driving, from road building to house building, from restaurant workers to shop clerks, are black.

Over this mass of economic integration, the apartheid government attempted to enforce social segregation and still maintain a white government: it was a plan which was doomed from the start.

Apartheid was based on a fallacy: the fallacy that nonwhites could be used as labor to drive society; that nonwhites could physically form a majority inside South Africa, but that they could not determine the nature of South African society.

This then, was the lie of apartheid: that it was possible, through strict segregation, to ensure that blacks could not rule over a country in which they were the majority.

The historical record is clear: there has never been a society in which the majority of the population has not determined the nature of that society.



South Africa's much-vaunted mineral wealth was built upon black labor. Above: Gold miners, Johannesburg, 1935. Apartheid tried to pretend that literally millions of blacks working in all industries did not exist for demographic purposes. This absurdity went as far as not even showing the sprawling "townships" which housed these millions of laborers on municipal maps. Apartheid also had to establish a "color bar" in the mines to prevent blacks from rising above menial laborer status to shift boss or foreman — proof, if any was needed, that the system was reliant on black labor.

White South Africans, it must be said, more or less believed the lie. They were happy to have black domestic servants cleaning their homes, ironing their clothes, making up the very beds in which they slept—and were prepared to believe that this mass of established black labor inside their territory would never have any effect upon the political power structure of their country.

It is said, in fact, that the definition of a white South African is "someone who would rather be murdered in their bed than make it."

Amusing? To be honest, not really—consider these true examples:

* Under apartheid, blacks could not use white public toilets, but they were used to clean those same toilets each day. One can only wonder at the naiveté of such an arrangement.

* Under apartheid, blacks could work in restaurant kitchens, prepare the food, put it on the plates, and deliver it to the white patrons' tables, but they could not eat that food at the same table in the same restaurant. What hypocrisy is that? Surely if one was going to be consistent, one would have forbidden blacks from working in restaurants completely. But no, apartheid didn't go that far; it was built upon the premise that blacks did the work.

Cynical observers talked about the "grass mower" syndrome amongst South African whites. They regarded black labor as akin to lawn mowers. A lawn mower sits quietly in its shed or garage until you need it, then it mows the grass, and then you put it back in the shed where it stays quietly, not causing any trouble, until the next time it is needed.

Somehow, white South Africans believed that black labor was like a lawn mower: you could have it around, and when you didn't need it, you could hide it in its

little shed where it would be good and quiet—until you needed it again.

The reality is, of course, dramatically different.

Another important part of the apartheid lie was that military force could keep the system intact. The demographic reality once again belied this: the South African white population totaled about five million at its height, while the black population at that time was around thirty million.

Of the five million whites, less than eight hundred thousand were of military serviceable age, and not all of these could be called up at any one time. The state had to rely on no more than a few hundred thousand military personnel to try and control a black population of millions.

Given that demographic reality, it can be seen that apartheid was unsustainable by military means. Yet the lie continued, and young white South Africans were conscripted into the army and police to fight and die for a system which was doomed from the very beginning.

At the same time, white Western healthcare and technology were made available on a massive scale. The largest hospital in the Southern Hemisphere was erected in the black township of Soweto, outside Johannesburg, specifically for the black population.

Infant mortality rates for blacks fell dramatically (and were way below that of the rest of black ruled Africa). This rapid population growth put additional pressure on the demographic makeup of the country.

As the demographic balloon swelled further and further, the apartheid government was forced to think out ever more stringent and oppressive laws to protect the whites as the black population continued to leapfrog in number year after year.

Laws such as detention without trial and the banning of books and people were bad enough by themselves, but as the conflict intensified, both sides started using methods which would be shunned by any decent society. The apartheid state used officially funded death squads and police torture became routine. The ANC placed bombs in restaurants, and encouraged mobs to necklace murder collaborators, amongst other outrages.

In the name of a lie—that apartheid could be sustained—the state caused morally repugnant acts to take place on both sides of the political divide. The black resistance movements adopted a guerrilla hit and run policy of attacks on strategic targets. To combat this unconventional war, the South African Police were given extended powers of detention and other draconian measures. These could only be short-term firefighting measures, as the main issue: that of preventing majority black occupation of the country, was never addressed by any apartheid law.

The white government tried to give practical application to the policy of “Grand Apartheid.” Independence was given to a number of traditional black tribal homelands, the first in the mid 1970s.

In this way, the apartheid government deluded itself into thinking that black political aspirations could be satisfied with the right to vote only in these tribal homelands—despite massive numbers of blacks living outside of these territories in the white urban areas. (These so-called “white” areas were not majority European once all the black domestic servants, laborers, and farm workers were counted.)

The white government also refused to adjust the size of these traditional tribal areas to fit the changed demographics, stubbornly insisting that the black homelands—some 13 percent of the country's surface area—could accommodate what was rapidly becoming over 80 percent of the total population, even if it contained much of the prime agricultural land, as was the case.

The South African built G5 cannon in action. Despite being technologically overwhelmingly superior, the South African Defence Force and Police simply did not have the manpower to indefinitely fight border wars and simultaneously suppress endless and growing internal rebellions from 90 percent of the population.

In a nutshell, the apartheid government refused to accept the basic truth of racial dynamics: those who occupy a space determine the nature of the society in that space, irrelevant of to whom that space originally belonged.

White South Africa's fate was sealed when the territorial division was not adjusted to fit in with the demographic realities, when all the effort was put into creating black homelands and none put into creating a white homeland, and with the continued insistence upon the use of black labor.

The partial reforms of the mid 1980s—repealing of the laws forbidding mixed racial marriages and mixed racial political parties, and limited constitutional reforms which gave Indians and Coloureds their own parliamentary chambers—did little to stop the increasing violence.

In fact, racial violence increased dramatically. The reforms created an unfulfilled "revolution of rising expectations," and it was precisely during this cycle of black violence and white counter violence that the racial war taking place inside the country exacted its highest death tolls ever.

In 1990, the white government finally faced the truth that it could no longer effectively control the ballooning black population, so it unbanned the ANC and released Nelson Mandela from prison. By 1994 power had been handed over to the ANC in a one-man, one-vote election. Although strict apartheid had ended in the 1980s, it is from 1994 that the policy is considered to have been laid to rest.

It was an inevitable result: apartheid could not be maintained. It was in

practical terms, unenforceable due to the demographic reality, and it was morally unacceptable as well, based as it was upon violent suppression.

White South Africans, therefore, sowed the seeds of their own downfall with apartheid, a system of segregation that could never be maintained in the face of their own use of black labor.

Apartheid had to fall: the only question was when, not if. The politicians, who sold it to white South Africans as their only hope and salvation, lied: either deliberately, or out of ignorance of the reality of the relationship between demographics and power.

Part of Soweto, the sprawling black 'township' outside Johannesburg. Built to house the millions of blacks working in "white" Johannesburg, Soweto was supposed to be so invisible that its streets and suburbs were not even given names, so that an address would typically read "house 4, Zone 1." Soweto was officially proclaimed in 1963 — at the very height of apartheid South Africa. This fact, more than anything else, underlines the bankruptcy of apartheid.

Can the Afrikaners be Saved?

From the above, it is clear that the use of nonwhite labor was the direct cause of the downfall of apartheid and white rule in South Africa. Afrikaners lost control of the country because of their lack of understanding of demographics, and not due to farfetched "conspiracies" or "betrayals," as many would like to believe.

This occupation took place because white South Africa failed to understand that if they employed black labor, those blacks would inevitably form the majority in that society, and ultimately—and rightly—demand political power.

The question therefore arises: given the current situation, can the Afrikaners be saved?

The answer is relatively simple:

* In a united South Africa, in which they are the perpetual minority, the answer is no.

* In a smaller region where Afrikaners form the majority population, the answer is yes.

No minority has every survived indefinitely in the face of a growing hostile majority, particularly one in South Africa where the material discrepancy between white and black is so vast.

There is only one way in which Afrikaners can be saved. This would be if

firstly they came to an understanding of the relationship between demographics and political power; and secondly, if they then adjust their expectations and political behavior in accordance with their actual numbers and their ability to majority occupy territory.

Only once a majority of Afrikaners understand this truth, can there even begin to be talk of a practical plan for saving them from ultimate long-term extermination at the hands of the Third World.

Theoretically, if a majority of Afrikaners should come to this understanding, then it would be possible for Afrikaners to save themselves—as no one else is going to save them.

Let us be positive and say that theoretically, Afrikaners did come to an understanding of the relationship between demographics and power politics.

Then they would stop wasting time blaming crackpot conspiracies for their downfall, and stop dancing around wasting time playing party politics in a majority rule system in which they are just as doomed to failure as they were under apartheid. Instead, they would start practically working toward creating a territory or region in which they became the demographic majority.

This would, as a result of their small numbers, be a much smaller territory than the current area of South Africa. Its exact location can be decided when and if that time ever comes. However, it must be majority occupied by Afrikaners (like Israel was created by being majority occupied by Jews), and those who settle there must be prepared to do their own labor. (There are immense problems in this, and this writer would be pleasantly surprised if the majority of Afrikaner farmers could be persuaded to dispense with their hundreds of farm laborers and mechanize like their American counterparts; or if the majority of white South African households could be persuaded to make their own beds and wash their own dishes instead of using the plentiful "maids," but that is another story.)

Yes, this means gathering together the stock Afrikaner nation into a defined area. For example (and this is just a theoretical example), if 500,000 Afrikaners had to settle in the old Eastern Transvaal, and physically occupy it, then this territory would de facto, and later even de jure, become an Afrikaner state.

The only way that Afrikaners can be spared the fate of all First World minorities in Africa, is for them to abandon their dependence on nonwhite labor, accept that their salvation lies in a smaller territory, and congregate in that smaller territory where they will form an outright demographic majority.

There is no other way: all else is chaff in the wind. History will tell if the Afrikaners have it within them to undertake this second Great Trek.

ES SAY TWO

The Myth of Mahatma Gandhi

One of the anachronisms of modern liberalism is that it elevates scoundrels to heroes and denigrates heroes into scoundrels. And when it cannot do that, liberalism simply lies.

So it is the case with one of liberalism's icons, Mahatma Gandhi. All over the world, the Indian leader Gandhi is held up as an icon of peace, pacifism, tolerance, and brotherly love.

Statues are erected in his honor, his "example" is taught to Western schoolchildren, and Hollywood has even made a film about him. In all of these, Gandhi is portrayed as the ultimate peacemaker, the living example of multiculturalism. Sadly, liberalism and the truth have seldom met.

In reality, Gandhi was a first class Indian racist who not only despised blacks, but also lower caste Indians.

Those who have been subjected to some "conventional" Gandhi propaganda will know that he was born in India, studied to become an attorney in England, spent many years "organizing passive resistance" in South Africa, and then returned to India to lead the passive resistance movement against British rule in that country. He was finally assassinated by one of his own kind.


COLUMBIA PICTURES
A WORLD EVENT
It took one remarkable man
to defeat the British Empire and
free a nation of 350 million people.
His goal was freedom for India.
His strategy was peace.
His weapon was his humanity.
GANDHI
His triumph changed the world forever.
RICHARD ATTENBOROUGH'S FILM "GANDHI"
BEN KINGSLEY
CANDICE BERGEN EDWARD FOX JOHN GIELGUD

The 1982 motion picture Gandhi *has helped to popularize the utterly false image of Gandhi as a man of peace dedicated to the brotherhood of man. The record shows that he was neither.*

Gandhi: The Anti-Black Racist

In the publicly accessible archives of the South African state records in Pretoria and in the Johannesburg public library are full sets of the newspaper which Gandhi started in that country: the *Indian Opinion.* In addition, the Indian government has built an Internet site dedicated to Gandhi, and much of his writing is now available

online as well. From these, and the official compilation of Gandhi's writings, the *Collected Works*, the true face of Gandhi emerges: an anti-black Indian racist.

Indian Opinion

PUBLISHED WEEKLY IN ENGLISH AND GUJARATI

A WEEK OF EXCITEMENT

"The Raw Kaffir"—Gandhi Describes Blacks

When Gandhi addressed a public meeting in Bombay on September 26, 1896, he had the following to say about the Indian struggle in South Africa:

"Ours is one continued struggle against degradation sought to be inflicted upon us by the European, who desire to degrade us to the level of the raw kaffir, whose occupation is hunting and whose sole ambition is to collect a certain number of cattle to buy a wife with, and then pass his life in indolence and nakedness." (1)

In 1904, opposing the then white British South African government's plan to draw up a register of all nonwhites in the urban areas, Gandhi wrote about "natives" who do not work: ***"It is one thing to register natives who would not work, and whom it is very difficult to find out if they absent themselves, but it is another thing—and most insulting—to expect decent, hardworking, and respectable Indians, whose only fault is that they work too much, to have themselves registered and carry with them registration badges."*** (2)

Commenting on a piece of legislation planned by the white Natal Municipal authority, called the Natal Municipal Corporation Bill, Gandhi wrote in his newspaper, the *Indian Opinion* on March 18, 1905:

"Clause 200 makes provision for registration of persons belonging to uncivilized races, resident and employed within the Borough. One can understand the necessity of registration of kaffirs who will not work, but why should registration be required for indentured Indians who have become free, and for their descendants about whom the general complaint is that they work too much?" (3)

"The Native: Little Benefit to the State"—Gandhi

The *Indian Opinion* published an editorial on September 9, 1905 under the heading, "The Relative Value of the Natives and the Indians in Natal." In it, Gandhi referred to a speech made by Rev. Dube, an early African nationalist, who said that an African had the capacity for improvement, if only the whites would give them the opportunity. In his response, Gandhi suggested that: ***"A little judicious extra taxation would do no harm; in the majority of cases it compels the native to work for at least a few days a year."*** (4)

Then he added: ***"Now let us turn our attention to another and entirely unrepresented community—the Indian. He is in striking contrast with the native.***

While the native has been of little benefit to the State, it owes its prosperity largely to the Indians. While native loafers abound on every side, that species of humanity is almost unknown among Indians here." (5)

Gandhi Complained About British Use of "Kaffir Police"

In a letter to the editor of *The Times* of London, published in November 12, 1906. Gandhi complained that under British rule, "kaffir police" were "hustling" Indians in South Africa. Gandhi wrote:

"Poor people were, under the registration effected by Lord Milner's advice, dragged at four o'clock on a cold winter's morning—from their beds in Johannesburg, Heidelberg, and Potchefstroom, and marched to the police station, or Asiatic Offices, as the case might be. It is they who under the Ordinance would be hustled by the kaffir police at every turn, and not the better-class Indians." (6)

Gandhi's opinion of a series of 1906 amendments to the "Asiatic Law," No. 3 of 1885, which placed certain restrictions upon Indians in British South Africa, are also insightful as to his true views on race. Writing in the *Indian Opinion* newspaper on June 8, 1907, Gandhi remarked that the law ***"does not apply to kaffirs and Cape Boys"*** (7) and went on to write that one of the main concerns he had with the act, which he called an "obnoxious law," was that a "kaffir police constable" could detain an Indian.

He wrote: ***"At present, only the Permit Secretary is authorized to inspect a permit. Under the new Act, every kaffir police constable can do so. Under the new Act, a kaffir police constable can ask [an Asiatic] for particulars of name and identity, and, if not satisfied, can take him to the police station."*** (8)

After dealing with a number of other grievances with the law, Gandhi added: ***"Is there any Indian who is not roused to fury by such a law? We should very much like to know the Indian whose blood does not boil. And it is incredible to us that any Indian may want to submit to such legislation."*** (9)

Gandhi's Role in the Bambetta Uprising

In 1906 a Zulu rebellion against British rule took place in the colony of Natal. His alleged pacifist ideals not with-standing, Gandhi joined up with the British forces and became an ambulance stretcher bearer, helping to suppress the black rebellion, known as the Bambetta Uprising.

In his memoirs of the campaign to help the British defeat the blacks, Gandhi wrote of how he saw a *"kaffir who did not wear the loyal badge"* —i.e. a Zulu who was not loyal to the British and who had taken part in the uprising against the white British colonial rule.

"As we were struggling along, we met a kaffir who did not wear the loyal badge. He was armed with an assegai and was hiding himself. However, we safely rejoined the troops on the further hill, whilst they were sweeping with their carbines the bushes below." (10)

Gandhi also remarked on how unreliable these "loyal" blacks were, writing that: ***"The Natives in our hands proved to be most unreliable and obstinate. Without constant attention, they would as soon have dropped the wounded man as not, and they seemed to bestow no care on their suffering countryman ."*** (11)

The most poignant line in Gandhi's Zulu war memoirs is this one, which

exposes his alleged pacifism as a hoax: ***"However, at about 12 o'clock we finished the day's journey, with no kaffirs to fight."*** (12)

Gandhi (middle row, center) serving in the British forces against the black Zulu Bambetta uprising, 1906. His eager participation in a war against the "kaffirs" comes as a shock to those who believe the propaganda about him being a "pacifist."

Contrary to the liberal myth, Gandhi never once tried to help anybody else but Indians, and even then, only upper caste Indians. He consistently sought a special position for his people which would be separated from and superior to that of the blacks. (13)

A good example came when the British colony of Natal took active steps to ensure that the Indians in that colony were deprived of the vote. "The Franchise Amendment Bill" introduced in 1896 prohibited Indians from registering for the vote, while allowing those already on the rolls to remain.

Within a few years, this eliminated the Indian vote as a factor in Natal. It was because of this law that Indian merchants asked Gandhi to stay in South Africa. It was also the cause of the establishment of the Natal Indian Congress, the first Indian political organization in South Africa. One of the first achievements of the Natal Indian Congress—which Gandhi established—was the creation of a third separate entrance to the Durban Post Office. The first was for whites, but previously Indians had to share the second with the blacks. The third entrance—for Indians alone—satisfied Gandhi. (14)

"Indian Ranked Lower than the Rawest Native"

In their petitions against the Natal franchise bill, the Indians, with Gandhi as their spokesman, complained that "the Bill would rank the Indian lower than the rawest Native." In attempting to protect their own position, they believed they had to separate themselves from the native blacks. (15)

In addition, other prominent Indians, all colleagues of Gandhi, frequently complained of being mixed in with Natives in railway cars, lavatories, pass laws, and in other regulations. (16)

Recalling his time in a Transvaal prison in October 1908, Gandhi said later that he spent the ***"first night in the company of some kaffir criminals, wild-looking, murderous, vicious, lewd and uncouth."*** (17)

Gandhi (center) with his secretary, Miss Schlesin, and his colleague Mr. Polak in front of his law office, South Africa, 1913.

Gandhi and Race

Gandhi was, despite modern propaganda, acutely aware of the differences between races, as this letter to W.T. Stead, an English friend of his in London, written in 1906, clearly shows: ***"As you were good enough to show very great sympathy with the cause of British Indians in the Transvaal, may I suggest your using your influence with the Boer leaders in the Transvaal? I feel certain that they did not share the same prejudice against British Indians as against the kaffir races but as the prejudice against kaffir races in a strong form was in existence in the Transvaal at the time when the British Indians immigrated there, the latter were immediately lumped together with the kaffir races and described under the generic term 'Coloured people.' Gradually the Boer mind was habituated to this qualification and it refused to recognize the evident and sharp distinctions that undoubtedly exist between British Indians and the kaffir races in South Africa."*** (18)

Indeed, Gandhi remarked about the issue of taxation of Indians in South Africa that ***"A kaffir is to be taxed because he does not work enough: an Indian is to be taxed because he works too much."*** (19)

Writing about a law which was designed to restrict Indian movement in the British Cape Colony, Gandhi objected on the basis that it dragged Indians "down with the kaffir(s)." He wrote: ***"The bye-law has its origin in the alleged or real, impudent and, in some cases, indecent behaviour of the kaffirs. But, whatever the charges are against the British Indians, no one has ever whispered that the Indians behave otherwise than as decent men. But, as it is the wont in this part of the world, they have been dragged down with the kaffir without the slightest justification."*** (20)

Gandhi was Aware of the Abusive Nature of his Words

In what context did Gandhi use this word "kaffir" which is most certainly a term of abuse? Gandhi understood full well the word's meaning, as he himself said later when commenting upon another person's use of the word to describe a Christian: ***"And finally, about Mr. Douglas who, as I have stated above, has tendered his resignation. The gentleman has been simply overhasty. He took offence at the Maulana Saheb's use of the word kaffir for a Christian. I can understand his resentment. It would have been better if the word kaffir were not used."*** (21)

In addition, Gandhi remarked, ***"If kaffir is a term of opprobrium, how much more so is Chandal?"*** referring to Hindu and Muslim slang words for each other. (22)

Therefore, there can be little doubt as to Gandhi's racist intention when he referred to "kaffirs" in South Africa, and only a deluded liberal would suggest otherwise.

"The Prominent Race"

In the *Government Gazette of Natal* for Feb. 28, 1905, a bill was published regulating the use of firearms by blacks and Indians. Commenting on the bill, Gandhi wrote in the *Indian Opinion* on March 25, 1905: ***"In this instance of the fire-arms, the Asiatic has been most improperly bracketed with the natives. The British Indian does not need any such restrictions as are imposed by the bill on the natives regarding the carrying of fire-arms. The prominent race can remain so by preventing the native from arming himself. Is there a slightest vestige of justification for so preventing the British Indian?"*** (23)

Gandhi, like many caste conscious Indians (he was born to a fairly high shop owner caste) was all in favor of segregation from the blacks.

His reaction to a 1906 petition launched by nonwhites in South Africa to the British king, demanding voting rights, reveals this attitude clearly:

"It seems that the petition is being widely circulated, and signatures are being taken of all coloured people in the three colonies named. The petition is non-Indian in character, although British Indians, being coloured people, are very largely affected by it. We consider that it was a wise policy on the part of the British Indians throughout South Africa, to have kept themselves apart and distinct from the other coloured communities in this country." (24)


THIS STATUE MARKS THE CENTENARY OF
THE EVENT ON THE NIGHT OF 7 JUNE 1893,
WHEN M. K. GANDHI WAS FORCIBLY REMOVED
FROM A TRAIN COMPARTMENT AT THE
PIETERMARITZBURG STATION
BECAUSE OF DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE.
"MY ACTIVE NON-VIOLENCE BEGAN FROM THAT DATE."
MAHATMA GANDHI

The Famous Train Incident

In the Hollywood film made about Gandhi, much emphasis was placed on a scene where he was arrested for riding in a South African train coach reserved for whites. This incident did indeed occur, but for very different reasons than those the film portrayed.

For the liberal myth is that Gandhi was protesting at the exclusion of nonwhites from the train coach: in fact, he was trying to persuade the authorities to let ONLY upper caste Indians ride with the whites.

It was NEVER Gandhi's intention to let blacks, or even lower caste Indians, share the white compartment.

Here, in Gandhi's own words, are his comments on this famous incident, complete with reference to upper caste Indians, who he differentiated from lower caste Indians by calling the former "clean":

"You say that the magistrate's decision is unsatisfactory because it would enable a person, however unclean, to travel by a tram, and that even the kaffirs would be able to do so.

"But the magistrate's decision is quite different. The Court declared that the kaffirs have no legal right to travel by tram. And according to tram regulations, those in an unclean dress or in a drunken state are prohibited from boarding a tram. Thanks to the Court's decision, only clean Indians or coloured people other than kaffirs, can now travel in the trams." (25)

Gandhi Supported Segregation

It is also a myth to presume that Gandhi was opposed to racial segregation.

Witness this piece of his writing, published in the *Indian Opinion*, of February 15, 1905. It was a letter to the white Johannesburg Medical Officer of Health, a Dr. Porter, concerning the fact that blacks had been allowed to settle in an Indian residential area:

"Why, of all places in Johannesburg, the Indian location should be chosen for dumping down all kaffirs of the town, passes my comprehension. Of course, under my suggestion, the Town Council must withdraw the kaffirs from the location. About this mixing of the kaffirs with the Indians I must confess I feel most strongly. I think it is very unfair to the Indian population, and it is an undue tax on even the proverbial patience of my countrymen." (26)

Gandhi's portrait used in Martin Luther King's office. Gandhi would have been horrified at the association.

Gandhi's Support for "Purity of Race"

In response to the rise of white nationalist politics, which stressed racial separation, Gandhi wrote in the *Indian Opinion* of September 24, 1903:

"We believe as much in the purity of race as we think they do; only we believe that they would best serve these interests, which are as dear to us as to them, by advocating the purity of all races, and not one alone. We believe also that the white race of South Africa should be the predominating race." (27)

On December 24, 1903, Gandhi added this in the *Indian Opinion: "The* ***petition dwells upon 'the co-mingling of the coloured and white races'. May we inform the members of the Conference that so far as British Indians are concerned, such a thing is particularly unknown. If there is one thing which the Indian cherishes more than any other, it is the purity of type."*** (28)

And yet the liberal delusion over Gandhi lives on. . . .

Sources:

(1) *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi Vol. II,* Ahmedabad, 1963, p. 74.

(2) *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. IV,* Ahmedabad, 1963, p. 193.

(3) MK Gandhi, *Indian Opinion,* March 18, 1905.

(4, 5) MK Gandhi, *Indian Opinion,* September 9, 1905.

(6) MK Gandhi, Letter to *The Times,* London, November, 12, 1906, as reproduced on The Complete Site on Mahatma Gandhi.

(7, 8, 9) MK Gandhi, *Indian Opinion,* June 8, 1907, "New Obnoxious Law," as

reproduced at The Complete Site on Mahatma Gandhi.

(10, 11, 12) MK Gandhi, "Memoirs of the Indian Stretcher Bearer Corps," as published in *Indian Opinion*, July 28, 1906, and reproduced on The Complete Site on Mahatma Gandhi.

(13, 14, 15, 16) James D. Hunt, *Gandhi and the Black People of South Africa*, Shaw University and reproduced on The Complete Site on Mahatma Gandhi.

(17) B. R. Nanda, *Mahatma Gandhi—A Biography*, page 105, The Official Mahatma Gandhi eArchive, Mahatma Gandhi Foundation—India.

(18) MK Gandhi, Letter to W.T. STEAD, London, November 16, 1906, from a photostat of the typewritten office copy: S.N. 4584, as reproduced at The Complete Site on Mahatma Gandhi.

(19) MK Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Volume III*, page 337, The Official Mahatma Gandhi eArchive, Mahatma Gandhi Foundation—India.

(20) MK Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Volume III*, page 285, The Official Mahatma Gandhi eArchive, Mahatma Gandhi Foundation—India.

(21) Mahadev Desai, *Day to day with Gandhi—Volume II*, page 291, The Official Mahatma Gandhi eArchive, Mahatma Gandhi Foundation — India.

(22) MK Gandhi, *The Hindu-Muslim Unity*, page 45, The Official Mahatma Gandhi eArchive, Mahatma Gandhi Foundation — India.

(23) MK Gandhi, *Indian Opinion*, March 25, 1905.

(24) MK Gandhi, *Indian Opinion*, March 24, 1906.

(25) MK Gandhi, *Indian Opinion*, June 2, 1906.

(26) MK Gandhi, *Indian Opinion*, Feb.15, 1905.

(27) MK Gandhi, *Indian Opinion* , September 24, 1903.

(28) MK Gandhi, *Indian Opinion*, Dec. 24, 1903.

ES SAY THREE

The Puzzle of Autogenocide

When reviewing the history of contemporary South Africa—with its violent crime rate and overt black-on-white racially motivated legislation and practice, the question inevitably arises in the mind of the observer: Why on earth did the Afrikaners ever agree to such a dispensation?

Surely, one could argue, Afrikaners, who have lived cheek-by-jowl with Africa for at least as long as Europeans have been in the Americas (the first permanent white settlement in South Africa dates from 1652), would have, of all people, been conscious of what Third World rule would mean. Therefore, the argument might go, would they not have been the ones most likely to have resisted any such transition?

Such a question is well-justified, and only an understanding of the psyche of Afrikaner society will provide the answer—which is multifaceted.

The first consideration to bear in mind is that in real, hard figures, the majority of Afrikaners did not support the handover to the ANC. This remarkable fact has been effectively hidden in the flurry of liberal/leftist books over the “democratic transition” in South Africa, but it remains a fact.

At the height of the reform program, shortly after the unbanning of the ANC by the FW de Klerk government in 1990, the official opposition (and hard-line apartheid-supporting) Conservative Party in South Africa was winning by-election after by-election against the ruling National Party.

After the Conservative Party had seized a formerly safe National Party seat in the town of Potchefstroom in 1992, the FW de Klerk government realized that it faced a serious crisis of dwindling support amongst the Afrikaners, and after placing the reform program on hold, called out a referendum amongst the white electorate, with the simple question: “Do you support the reform program or not?”

This referendum—the last time that whites were able to vote on a separate

voters' roll—saw the following breakdown of voting patterns: 54 percent of Afrikaners voted no, 46 percent of Afrikaners voted yes, 96 percent of English speaking white South Africans voted yes, and only 4 percent of English speaking whites voted no.

From these figures it can be seen that a majority of Afrikaners opposed the reform program, and that it was only a coalition of Afrikaner liberals and the English speaking segment of the population which allowed the National Party government to claim a victory (66 percent yes vote) in the referendum.

This is, however, cold comfort, because even though a bare majority of Afrikaners voted no, two questions immediately arise:

- Why did 46 percent of Afrikaners vote yes?

- Why did such an overwhelming majority of English speaking whites vote yes? (This is a significant fact, considering that English speakers made up nearly 46 percent of the then white South African population.)

The 46 Percent Afrikaner Yes Vote Explained

There are two primary reasons why nearly half of the Afrikaners supported the reform program which led to black majority rule in South Africa: religion and the reality that apartheid was unenforceable over the long term. Discounting the small genuinely leftist Afrikaner element which was always a fringe phenomenon in Afrikaner politics, it is fair to say that as a group, Afrikaners were solidly conservative, and, racially speaking, had a paternalistic approach toward the black population, certainly never viewing them as equals. This view was founded in the deeply Calvinistic roots of the Afrikaner psyche, which dominated all echelons of Afrikaner society.

The single largest and most influential Afrikaner church was (and still is) the Nederlandse Gereformeerde Kerk—the Dutch Reformed Church, or DRC. The DRC endorsed apartheid as biblically justified and used suitable Old Testament quotes where God told the ancient Israelites not to mix and to remain separate. As long as the DRC endorsed apartheid—which was done in public at Sunday church services and at formal church gatherings called synods—the broader Afrikaner voting public remained solidly behind the policy, unmoved by liberal politics in the slightest.

Beginning in the late 1970s, however, important theologians within the DRC started agitating for a shift in policy.

Arguing that a policy of racial separation, enforced as it was with military force, was contrary to the message of peace and universality under God as contained in the New Testament, liberal theologians began changing the position of the DRC toward apartheid. Finally, in 1982, the "Coloured" section of the DRC adopted what became known as the Belhar Declaration, which declared apartheid a heresy and a sin.

From there, antiapartheid sentiment became widespread throughout the hierarchy of the DRC, with Sunday sermons and official meetings increasingly speaking out against the policy.

Conservative Afrikaner Christians were aware of what was happening, and some prominent figures even took the highly unusual step of breaking with the DRC in 1986 to form the Afrikaanse Protestante Kerk (Afrikaner Protestant Church—APK) which reverted to the pre-Belhar Declaration policy position of the DRC. Yet the damage had been done—amongst the churchgoing Afrikaner middle and upper classes, the notion that apartheid was unbiblical had taken hold. Much of the 46

percent Afrikaner yes votes in the 1992 referendum were motivated purely on this basis.

It comes, therefore, as no surprise that the rejection of apartheid by the DRC coincided precisely with the first major moves to dismantle apartheid by the National Party. The leaders of that party were intertwined and in many cases shared leadership with the DRC.

It is another popular liberal myth that apartheid was dismantled only by the FW de Klerk National Party government. In reality, the major building blocks of apartheid were destroyed nearly a decade before De Klerk even took office. His predecessor, PW Botha, was the one who abolished the Influx Control laws, popularly called the "Pass Laws" which controlled the number of blacks entering the white urban areas in 1982. It was the PW Botha government which adopted a new constitution in 1983 which introduced a mixed (Indian, Coloured and white) parliament and cabinet. (It is ironic in the extreme that South Africa had a mixed race cabinet as far back as 1983, despite liberal bleating about "apartheid" lasting until the 1990s.)

It was also the PW Botha government which abolished the antiracial miscegenation laws (the Mixed Marriages Act) in 1983, and most of the social segregation laws around the same time. In fact apartheid, as white South Africans of the 1960s would have known it, had vanished by 1986 at the latest. There is, of course, a clear relationship between the repudiation of apartheid by the DRC and the reformation program of the DRC-influenced National Party.

This rejection of apartheid on theological grounds by a significant element of the Afrikaner population was underpinned by the reality that apartheid in practice was unsustainable. Simply put, apartheid was never designed to create a white, or Afrikaner state, but merely to set up a social structure in which nonwhites could be used as cheap labor while the white ruling elite segregated themselves from the reality of Africa—by force.

Whites in South Africa used nonwhites to work in their houses, shops, factories, mines (to extract the minerals upon which the country's wealth was based), and in the fields of the Afrikaner-owned farms. Yet, at the same time, those millions of black laborers were expected to remain out of sight, shut away in massive "townships" located only a few miles outside the main white town centers, and expected to find political fulfillment in the "homelands"— traditional black tribal areas set aside for that purpose.

Apartheid then, contained the great fallacy that it was possible to enforce social segregation over a racially mixed economy. Apartheid tried to deny the historical reality that "demography is destiny"—and tried to use blacks as labor on a massive scale. It ignored the fact that this allowed the blacks to majority occupy the country demographically. It tried to pretend that they would be happy even though they were denied political rights in all but 13 percent of the country they now occupied. (The 13 percent was the amount of South African territory which made up the "homelands.")

There has never been an example in all of history where a minority has indefinitely ruled over a majority by force. The single greatest lesson of history is that those who majority occupy a territory will determine the nature of the society in that territory, no matter how violently or forcibly that minority tries to enforce its rule.

So it was that large numbers of Afrikaners, already primed by the belief that

their god had rejected apartheid, looked on aghast at the increasingly violent means to which the state resorted to suppress the ever growing black uprising, and decided that it could not be maintained. Hence the large yes vote in the 1992 referendum.

And of course, they were right. Anyone who lived through those years in South Africa would have been familiar with the staggering levels of political violence in that country, which saw the police and army deploying armored vehicles in the streets of all parts of the country to try and keep some form of order. A continuous formal State of Emergency held sway in South Africa from 1983 to 1990, indicative of the scale of the black uprising which saw millions of nonwhites physically resisting the white-dominated military, which never had more than a few hundred thousand armed reserves upon which to draw at maximum capability.

Apartheid was untenable and unenforceable over the long term, based as it was upon a policy of ruling over blacks, rather than separating white society from the Third World completely, as would have been the only real long-term solution.

The realization that the apartheid old order was unsustainable, combined with the theological input, are, therefore, the two main reasons why some 46 percent of Afrikaners supported the reform program.

The 96 Percent English Speaking Yes Vote Explained

The remarkably high English-speaking white South African support for the reform program always comes as a surprise to political observers from outside the country.

It is easily explicable in terms of understanding a number of factors which influenced the traditional hostility that existed between Afrikaners and English speakers:

(1) The relative late arrival (in immigration terms) of much of the English-speaking element;

(2) The generally higher educational level of English speakers which made them far more susceptible to leftist propaganda, and

(3) The wider realization amongst that population group of the unsustainable

nature of apartheid.

Finally, the relatively large Jewish element amongst English-speaking South Africans played a not insignificant role in shaping English-speaking South African political sentiment, particularly in terms of the English-speaking mass media and resultant political trendsetting, which was uniformly leftist with only minor exceptions.

The cultural divisions between English- and Afrikaans-speaking whites in South Africa were very real and deep—and encouraged by the traditional apartheid government. English and Afrikaans speakers were segregated from each other from school level up, reaching into university and even the workplace (the latter resulted from the first two, and was not legislated).

So it was that the majority of civil servants under the old apartheid regime were Afrikaans-speaking. This strict segregation was made even more stringent by the fact that the top echelons of the civil service, government, and even the DRC were reserved for a secret Afrikaner society called the Broederbond (the Brotherhood) which, in its constitution, specifically forbade membership to English speakers.

As a result, the old divisions sowed from the time of the Anglo-Boer War at the turn of the twentieth century remained fresh and were encouraged. This led to the situation where English speakers would oppose anything to do with apartheid, associating that policy with Afrikaners, even if it appeared to be in their interests (such as segregated schools and so forth).

The fact that a very large number of English speakers were the product of post World War II emigrants to South Africa added to this volatile mix, as the majority of those people had no cultural, historical, or political links to South Africa at all. Furthermore, most of them still had a foreign nationality as a backup “in case things went wrong” as they used to say. These people formed the majority of the estimated 1.5 million whites who left South Africa between 1994 and 2006.

A further generalization which can be made is that English speakers were on average better educated than their Afrikaner counterparts. This was a double-edged sword—although it gave them social standing, it also exposed them to the traditional left-leaning views which are universally associated with higher education, and this also played a role in shaping the English-speaking community’s political position. They were also, as a general rule, more aware of the unsustainable nature of apartheid, although they did not hesitate to take advantage of the short-term “benefits” it had to offer.

The Jewish population of South Africa—numbering in the hundreds of thousands at its height—also played a hugely disproportionate role in shaping political opinion amongst English speakers.

Militant leftist Jews played a dominant role in helping the ANC’s campaign against the state (for example, all of the whites arrested along with Nelson Mandela in the early 1960s for plotting violent revolution, were Jewish—see the book *Rivonia’s Children: Three Families and the Cost of Conscience in White South Africa* by Glenn Frankel, Farrar, Straus & Giroux).

The several hundred thousand Jews who counted amongst South Africa’s English speakers, also contributed greatly to the support for the reform program amongst that population segment.

South African Apartheid's Demise Inevitable

The real lesson to be learned from apartheid South Africa is, therefore, not why the whites agreed to the handover to Third World rule, but rather to gain an understanding of why it was inevitable.

The truth is that even if the whites had decided *en masse* not to hand over power, the system they had in place would not have ensured their long-term survival.

Even if the reform process had been stopped, and the country had returned to apartheid, given the social construct, it would have been only a matter of time before the overwhelming weight of demography brought about political change in South Africa.

Segregation by itself provides no answer to the racial issue: only physical geographical separation provides any lasting solution, and apartheid was created on the premise of blacks sharing geography but occupying a lower social status. This is the great lesson to be learned from South Africa: separation, not segregation.

ES SAY FOUR

How the Mighty Fall

Formerly titled: South African Army Collapses under Third World Rule (2003)

The South African Defense Force, once the strongest army on the African continent, has dissolved into anarchy since the introduction of black rule in 1994. Less than half of its "soldiers" are medically fit, the AIDs rate is estimated to be in the region of 60 percent, and its equipment readiness level has dropped to the point where the country has only four tanks and eight armored cars left to defend itself.

The decline in the fortunes of the SA Army began after the handover of power to the ANC in 1994, when members of the armed wings of both the ANC, and a smaller more radical black movement, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), were incorporated into the renamed South African National Defense Force (SANDF). These two armed wings were known as MK and APLA respectively.

"Old" South African Air Force Impalas in flight.

Black Racism Kills White Soldiers

Signs of racial enmity within the ranks of the SANDF, driven by the presence of former MK and APLA cadres, boiled over into naked murderous anti-white sentiment in 1999, when on September 16 th of that year, a former APLA guerilla who had been inducted into the SANDF killed eight white soldiers at the Tempe military base in Bloemfontein ("Tempe Soldier Still Critical," *Mail and Guardian*, Sep 22, 1999).

A special police investigations team were "reluctantly forced to admit" that Lieutenant Sibusiso Madubela, 28, had brushed aside black colleagues to kill six white officers and a white civilian woman and wound five white soldiers ("Countdown to slaughter," *Sunday Times*, September 19, 1992).

Since then, white soldiers in the SANDF have been slowly but surely squeezed out, leaving an overwhelmingly black-staffed army in place—with sad but predictable consequences.

Ruined State of the SANDF Revealed in Parliament

According to a South African parliamentary subcommittee briefing on defense, held in July 2002, the SANDF suffers from the following problems:

- More than half of South Africa's 76,000 soldiers are medically unfit and the SANDF is in a "serious crisis."

- Of its 76,000 troops, the SANDF could deploy only one operational brigade of 3,000 men.

- It was "impossible" to deploy 19 regular army companies and 23 reserve platoons because of a lack of funds.

- Training had virtually come to a halt.

- Equipment was in a deplorable state, with only 4 out of 168 Olifant tanks and 8 of 242 Rooikat armored cars still operational.

- Lack of funds had caused a shortage of fuel. In the air force, funds were allocated for only 2,400 flying hours instead of the 7,200 requested, and pilots were resigning in droves. "The air force usually runs out of aviation fuel every September," said a member of the portfolio committee.

- Reduction of the armed forces from 104,000 in 1994 to the present 76,000 had involved massive cash payouts. This had turned the defense force into "an armed welfare department," said Hendrik Schmidt, a DA portfolio committee member.

- The defense force was seriously top-heavy, with a ratio of one general for every 293 men, compared with a general for every 2,000 men in the United States army.

- More than 52 percent of the defense force budget was spent on personnel costs and only 0.5 percent on new equipment.

- AIDs is a major problem. The portfolio committee was told that seven out of every ten deaths in the armed forces was AIDs-related.

- A medical specialist at one of the country's military hospitals said six out of every ten soldiers tested HIV-positive after being admitted to hospital, and that an AIDs infection rate of 60 percent was "feasible" ("Nearly half of SA army not fit for combat," *Independent Newspapers*, July 13, 2002).



The Olifant tank — in 2003, there were only four operational tanks left in the new South African National Defence Force.

Bad Teeth

Other details of the decline in the effectiveness of the SANDF seem almost

comical in nature: For example, “dental reasons” have reduced the number of troops that can be deployed internationally at 1 SA Infantry Battalion in Bloemfontein, from 612 to a mere 138, the unit’s commander, Colonel TC Mokhosi, told another parliamentary subcommittee in August 2002 (“Army’s image dented as troops lose their bite,” *Independent Newspapers*, August 1, 2002).

This means that a total of 474 soldiers in 1 SA Infantry Battalion, or 77.5 percent, have bad teeth, which renders them unfit for service. Speculation is rife as to the cause of the bad teeth pandemic, with theories ranging from AIDs through to undiscipline. The SANDF has refused to comment (Ibid.).

Colonel Mokhosi also told MPs the general state of health was so poor that the unit received 175 sick notices a week in winter, which was preventing the battalion from participation in certain training programs (Ibid.).

Many of the army’s other 38,000 unfit soldiers also have dental problems (“An army of tooth tiffies could save us,” *Independent Newspapers,* August 8, 2002).

Generals with Faked Qualifications

It seems as if the SANDF suffers not only from bad teeth, AIDs, and no equipment, but also from general staff members who have faked their qualifications in order to land themselves plum jobs.

At least two SANDF generals, Ernest Zwane and Petronella Mari, both former members of the ANC’s armed wing, MK, were arrested in November 2002 for forging their tertiary qualifications (“SANDF’s image tarnished,” *News24*, November 11, 2002).

In addition, police arrested two other ex-MK soldiers, a SANDF colonel and an ex-colonel, on charges of fraud of about R20 million of the SANDF demobilization fund in 2001 (Ibid.).

No Problem, Says ANC Defense Minister

Even more comical was the reaction of the ANC’s minister of defense to these revelations: Defense Minister Mosiuoa Lekota dismissed them with the comment, “I remain satisfied that there is nothing we cannot deal with” (“An army of tooth tiffies could save us,” *Independent Newspapers,* August 8, 2002).

Third World Destruction

The state of the SANDF is but one example of the collapse of South Africa’s formerly First World infrastructure. The pattern is being repeated across the board.

ES SAY FIVE

When the River Ran Red

The year is 1838. Dodging the flurry of spears, the Boer commander, Andries Pretorius, rushes forward to seize the Zulu warrior. Pretorius has decided to capture a Zulu alive, in the midst of an epic battle involving more than 15,000 warriors and just 468 Boers. He wants to send the captive to Dingaan, the Zulu king, to discuss that native nation's terms of surrender.

The Zulu warrior has no intention of being taken alive, and stabs viciously at Pretorius with his assegai. This is a Zulu spear, normally a long-shafted throwing weapon, whose shank has been broken shorter for use as a close-quarter stabbing instrument.

Pretorius shoots at the Zulu. The single-shot, front-loading musket means he has only one chance of success. There is no reloading time in close-quarter combat. To his horror, Pretorius sees the smoke-trailing ball whiz past the Zulu's ear. At the same time, the Zulu lunges forward, causing Pretorius's horse to stumble backwards, throwing the white commander onto the ground.

Leaping to his feet, Pretorius now knows that he is fighting for his life. While the din of the greater battle goes on all around him, this fight is now personal.

The Zulu once again leaps to the attack, knowing that he is now, at last, on equal terms with the white man, who can no longer use his magic shooting stick, and has no weapon comparable to the assegai in his possession. Pretorius just manages to side step the spear point, striking it away with the butt of his now useless gun.

Spinning round, the Zulu raises his spear high above his head and thrusts down, as he has been drilled in the Zulu's disciplined army. It is the blow which, if it strikes its target, will be fatal.

Pretorius sees the blow coming. Defenseless, he is forced to grab the spear point with his bare left hand and ward it away from his chest. The sharp spear point cuts deeply into his palm, embedding itself into his hand at an angle which makes it almost impossible for the Zulu to pull it out once again.

Simultaneously, Pretorius seizes the amazed Zulu by the throat with his free right hand, and using his body weight, throws the black man to the ground in an attempt to strangle him.

The Zulu struggles, and having two good hands, is about to break free, when one of Pretorius's colleagues comes upon the scene. He pulls the assegai out of the white commander's hand, and plunges that weapon into the Zulu's side, ending the struggle.

Pretorius remounts his steed, and heads back into the Boer camp for treatment. He is unconcerned, as he knows by now that this greatest of all battles between the Boers and the Zulus has already been won.

The main Zulu army has been broken in two, and the river which runs along the one side of the Boer camp is stained red with Zulu blood, so that the place and the tributary water known previously as the Ncome, will soon be renamed Blood River.

The Zulu defeat, which will see three thousand of their number killed on the battlefield, is, Pretorius knows, a fitting revenge for the deception and murder committed by that nation over the past several months.

The Historical Prelude to War

The great clash between the Boer and Zulu nations was not, as leftist historians like to claim, the result of ruthless white colonialism suppressing an indigenous people. On the contrary, it was the product of the Zulu rejection of an extremely reasonable and peaceful attempt at negotiation by the Boers.

The Boers, hardy pioneers of Dutch, French, and German descent, were the people who had opened up much of what was later to become South Africa. Their first antecedents had landed on the southernmost tip of Africa in 1652, only some forty years after the Virginia Company landed on Jamestown Island.

Settling the area now known as Cape Town, the only natives the white settlers came into contact with were the Hottentots and Bushmen. As they grew in number, the European settlers expanded east and north, only meeting their first black tribe, the Xhosa, some five hundred miles away, on South Africa's east coast. The Xhosas were busy migrating south, fleeing the warlike Zulu tribe to the north, who were engaged in an imperialist expansion of their own.

White settlement halted at this firm eastern frontier border for just under a century. It was not, however, a time of peace. The Boer farmers living on the border were subjected to constant raids by the Xhosa. This caused much physical harm to, and discontent amongst, the frontier farmers, who blamed the Dutch-ruled colonial government back in Cape Town for the lawlessness on the border.

This frontier farmer discontent was fueled further when the British seized control of the Cape Colony from the Dutch during the Napoleonic Wars to prevent that colony falling into French hands, controlling as it did, the merchant and naval refueling station on the way to the Far East.

The new colonial masters not only started anglicizing the colony, but also abolished slavery in such a way that compensation was made impossible.

Fed up with the incessant attacks from the Xhosa and British attempts to extinguish their language and culture, groups of frontier farmers, filled with the sense

of Manifest Destiny seen only again in the opening of the American West, set forth to the north and the east in a movement known as the Great Trek. The Trekkers, as they became known, bypassed the Xhosa nation in search of new, unsettled territory, in which they could establish independent Boer nations.

So it was that by 1836, the Boer wagons had crossed the great mountain range on the plains before the east coast of Southern Africa, in an act of audacity that few thought possible. The mountain range had been named the Drakensberg—the Dragon Mountains—out of respect for their renowned impassability.

The Boer leader of the time, Piet Retief, one of the instigators of the Great Trek, had identified a large piece of land to the north of the Zulu kingdom, which lay uninhabited and open to settlement.

Retief knew that if he wanted the land for his people, he could just take it. However, he wished to live in peace with his Zulu neighbors, and before letting his people take possession of the land, he opened negotiations with the Zulu king Dingaan, so that there would be no misunderstanding between the two peoples.

Leaving behind the main body of his Trekkers, Retief went to the Zulu king's capital, Umgungundhlovo ("the place of the elephant") to negotiate a peace treaty.

His first visit to Dingaan's capital—no more than a particularly large circle of reed and grass huts—took place on November 5. It was preceded by a letter sent to the Zulu king explaining the purpose of his visit.

First, Retief recovered some cattle stolen from the Zulu king by a lesser chieftain. In this way, Retief thought he had gained the king's favor. Dingaan agreed to give land to the Boers.

Retief returned to Umgungundhlovo on February 3, 1838, along with sixty volunteers, including his own son and three other children.

The next day, Retief and Dingaan formally signed a treaty—with the Zulu king imitating writing by scratching an "X" on the document—giving possession of the land to the Boers.

Delighted, the Boers made ready to leave, and scouts were sent back to the main encampments to inform them of the successful outcome.

As Retief and his party were about to saddle up, a messenger arrived from Dingaan. The Boer party was invited to a special celebration to mark the signing of the treaty, and their presence was requested once again inside the royal enclosure.

Although suspicious, Retief did not want to offend Dingaan, so he accepted the offer. As had been the custom all along, the Boers made their appearance in the royal enclosure, unarmed, their firearms stacked up neatly outside against the reed walls.

While they were given food and drink, they were subjected to a dance by a Zulu impi, or warrior unit. An account of the events, recorded by a white missionary present at the scene, told how the impi, while dancing, drew ever closer to the Boers, till they were just in front of the seated whites. Then the Zulu king leaped to his feet and shouted, "Kill the white wizards!"

The impi fell upon the surprised Boers. Some of them drew their hunting knives and tried to ward off the attackers, but they were quickly overcome.

Bound with reed ropes, the whites were then dragged out to Hlomo Amabutho,

the Hill of Execution, near the Zulu capital. There they were clubbed to death, one by one, with Retief kept till last, forced to watch his own son being murdered in this gruesome fashion. After Retief's heart was extracted and presented to Dingaan as proof that the Boer leader was dead, the bodies were left for the vultures.

Dingaan gave orders for the full might of his army to attack the Boer encampments, who were still under the impression that all had gone well.

The scattered encampments were totally unprepared for the slaughter which followed. They fully expected the successful negotiators to return the next day, and rejoicing in the promised peace and ultimate independence, had not posted any guards that night.

It was an error. Just before dawn, the barking of some dogs aroused the outlying wagons—and then, thousands upon thousands of Zulu warriors attacked the several hundred Trekker women, children, and old men as they lay sleeping.

The Boer historian, Gustav Preller, provided a harrowing account of the scene after interviewing survivors. He wrote, "All around dozens and dozens of bodies . . . babies who had had their heads smashed open against the wagon wheels, women, dishonored and in some Zulu custom, their breasts cut off . . . in a wagon, blood filled to a height of several inches, the life blood of an entire family ebbed out where they lay. . . . Jan Bezuidenhout, one of the few young men who had not gone ahead with the Retief party, grabbed his four-month-old baby daughter out of her crib and ran off through the undergrowth. . . . having lost his pursuers a few miles away, Bezuidenhout checked for the first time on his daughter in his arms. She was dead; a single spear stroke had killed her."

The slaughter became known as Weenen, the Dutch word for weeping, and a town of that name still stands near the spot. Half of the Boer settlers had been killed.

Piet Retief is murdered. Part of the marble frieze in the Voortrekker Monument, Pretoria.

Andries Pretorius is Summoned

The murderous turn of events, followed quickly by several other setbacks, forced the Boers to face the reality that they now had to either abandon their quest for independence and return to the Cape Colony, or stand and fight. They chose the latter.

Calling upon the lawyer Andries Pretorius to take charge of the settlement on the East Coast, the Boers prepared to strike back against the unprovoked Zulu attack.

Pretorius arrived at the main Boer camp at the Tugela River on November 22, 1838. Officially appointed as commander in chief on November 25, Pretorius began his military preparations.

Even so, his forces were tiny. When the Boer force left seeking battle on November 27, it contained only about 468 Boers, including three Scotsmen. In order to provide extra protection, the Boer column of sixty-four ox wagons traveled four abreast, instead of the usual single file. Each night, they were pulled together into a circular defensive formation, known as a *laager* .

Pretorius had correctly decided that even with the two front-loading cannon in his possession, his force was too weak to defeat the entire Zulu army in an open field. Instead he would force the enemy to attack the Boer encampment.

Each day patrols and scouting parties were sent ahead, sometimes led by

Pretorius himself, to make sure that no unexpected surprises were waiting over the horizon.

By December 8, 1838, the Boer party had reached the Waschbank River, and on the following day they reached the Zandspruit tributary. It was here, on December 9, that the Boer chaplain accompanying the party, Sarel Cilliers, first made a pledge during his nightly sermon to the Boers, that if God would help them defeat the Zulus, then they and their descendants would celebrate that day ever more to honor God, and that they would build a church to honor the event. This oath, known in Afrikaner folklore to this day as the "Covenant," was to be repeated each night until December 15.

Still there appeared no movement from the Zulu side. Pretorius decided to move camp to the Buffalo River on December 12, hoping to provoke the Zulus by moving further and further into their territory. That day he sent out two patrols: one under the command of his deputy, Commandant De Lange, and another, under the Scotsman Parker. It was this latter group which first saw action, and coming upon a small group of Zulus, they killed the warriors and took the women as prisoners.

Presented with the prisoners, Pretorius gave them a piece of white cloth, upon which he had written his name and a message that he was leading a commando to punish the Zulus. If, however, Dingaan was willing to cooperate, Pretorius wrote, he was still willing to make peace—an extraordinarily generous offer in light of the murders which had just taken place. Given instructions to hand the message to Dingaan, the prisoners were set free.

This offer was ignored, and on December 13, a large number of Zulus and cattle were spotted near the Boer camp. A few months previously, another Boer captain, Pieter Uys, had been tricked by just such a ploy. Zulu warriors, crouching down behind their toughened animal-skin shields, appeared from afar to be a group of cattle, putting Uys at his ease. He had, however, been murdered in a surprise attack from the "cattle."

Pretorius did not make the same mistake, and he sent a 120-strong mounted unit to investigate these new "cattle." He was proven correct—they turned out to be Zulus, and in the resultant short fight eight warriors were killed but there were no injuries amongst the Boers. Pretorius now knew that the Zulus were preparing for battle.

On December 15 he moved the Boer camp to a position alongside the Ncome River, itself a tributary of the Buffalo River. A scouting expedition that day confirmed the presence of two huge Zulu armies a short distance away.

Pretorius gave his final battle orders. The wagons were to be drawn into a half circle formation: one side looking onto a large hippopotamus path facing the Ncome River, another adjoining side facing a soil erosion ditch, and the third side facing the open plain. The interior of the laager was large enough to contain all the horses and oxen.

The wagons were tied together with leather ropes, and all openings between and below the wagons were closed off with another Pretorius innovation, the so-called "fighting gates," which were slatted wood fixtures through which the defenders could fire their guns.

Two small openings were left to allow cavalry units to enter and leave the

laager, sealed with removable fighting gates. Finally, lanterns were attached to the end of large ox whips. When the ox whips were planted upright in the ground, they dangled in front of the laager, serving as forward lighting during the dark hours. (Zulus present at the battle, and later captured, told of how they had believed the lights waving in the breeze above the Boer camp were spirits. Fear of these spirits was the reason why they had not attacked at night, as was their custom.)

The Battle Is Joined

In Pretorius's own account of the battle, he wrote that as the mist cleared on the morning of December 16, he saw that the Boer camp was completely encircled by tens of thousands of Zulu warriors. Estimates placed the number of Zulus at between fifteen thousand and twenty-five thousand—although no official count was possible. Nonetheless, wrote Pretorius, it was a "terrible sight."

The Boers had been up, ready and armed, two hours before daybreak, and all preparations had been made. The two cannon had been positioned, and the fighting gates prepared. Expecting to run out of ammunition for the cannon, the Boers had selected suitably sized stones to use as a last resort, and these were stacked up at strategic points along the perimeter. They would be used.

The front lines of the Zulu force sat still, squatting, only about forty paces from the wagons, waiting for the signal to attack. Pretorius decided to seize the initiative. At his signal, the silence was broken with three bursts of fire from the Boer guns, joined by two blasts from the cannon.

The Boers were disciplined—they had been ordered to only fire a limited number of times, and they did. As the billows of gunpowder smoke lifted, they saw that the surviving Zulus had fled some five hundred paces from their former front line, leaving behind dozens of their dying and dead comrades.

The Boers then heard the noise of the Zulu spear shafts being broken to be made into shorter stabbing weapons. A frontal assault was now coming. A few minutes later, the Zulu force stormed the wagons, screaming wildly, shields held up on high, and assegais held in readiness.

The withering gunfire ripped through the Zulu ranks, and while some managed to reach the wagons, they were gunned down without being able to penetrate the

wagon canvasses.

In the soil erosion ditch, another group of attacking Zulus climbed up on each other's shoulders in an attempt to create a human bridge across to the wagons. Cilliers, the fighting churchman, was ordered to ward off the attack. Attacking the Zulus from above, Cilliers's men killed at least four hundred Zulus, although one Boer, Philip Fourie, was wounded when an assegai struck him in the side.

Finally, a well-placed cannon shot into the ditch blew the Zulu human bridge apart, and the survivors fled the ditch in disarray. This sparked off a temporary retreat by the Zulu forces, and marked the end of the second unsuccessful attempt to break the Boer lines. The wounded Boer, Fourie, was taken back inside the wagon circle and treated.

As the Zulus sat waiting for their new orders, Pretorius ordered another burst of cannon fire into their ranks. This provoked them into a spontaneous charge against the wagon lines. Although it was the longest single attack of the nine-hour battle, it was utterly defeated. Wave after wave of attackers were mown down. The red hot gun barrels had to be handled with wet cloths while being reloaded and fired.

As the third attack receded, the first surprise Boer counterattack was launched. The mobile fighting gates were swung open, and a cavalry unit charged the Zulu lines. Shooting from the saddle, the Boers tried to outflank the Zulu lines to their left. Desperate Zulu resistance, which saw hundreds more of their number killed, warded off the encircling action, and the Boer commando was forced to retreat back to the wagons.

There the Boers regrouped and launched a second attempt, driving the Zulus further and further away. It was only with the third mounted charge that they broke through the Zulu lines. Once through, the Boer cavalry turned around and attacked the Zulus from the rear. Combined with accurate gun and cannon fire from within the wagon circle, the main Zulu force facing the open plain was broken up.

Simultaneously, a reserve Zulu force tried to cross the Ncome River to attack the laager. This attempt failed as the Boer marksmen gunned down so many Zulus that their blood literally stained the water red.

Then Pretorius himself led a new cavalry charge from within the laager. This was the last straw for the Zulu army. Cut into sections, with thousands dead, they broke rank and fled the battlefield.

Dividing his cavalry into two units, Pretorius ordered them to pursue the Zulus. This resulted in a three-hour chase through the bush, during which hundreds more Zulus were killed. It was during this pursuit that Pretorius was wounded.

Two other Boers suffered assegai wounds—but these three nonfatal wounds were the only casualties that the Boers sustained in the entire battle. At least three thousand Zulus died on the battlefield, and in the days which followed many more died from their wounds.

The Aftermath

Early the next morning Pretorius ordered the camp to be broken up, and for the commando to be moved straight to the Zulu king's capital. He was confident that the Zulus no longer posed any significant threat, and he was right.

However, not even Pretorius expected the sight which awaited him on December 20 at Umgungundhlovo. Dingaan had fled, taking his wives and cattle. The great circular camp of reed huts was abandoned and on fire, symbolic of the destruction of Zulu power.

The Boers then found the skeletonized remains of Retief and his party. The bodies were identified by the remains of their clothing, and Retief by the leather bag which still lay draped over his shoulder bone. The bag contained the treaty, signed by Dingaan, giving the Boers the unoccupied land to the north. Retief and his men were buried by the Boers on Christmas Day, 1838.

As he fled north, Dingaan was captured by a rival tribe, the Swazis. Previously, he had persecuted them, and they exacted revenge on the Zulu king, murdering him without further ado. The new Zulu king, Mpande, confirmed the contents of the treaty with the Boers, and the first Boer republic in Southern Africa was established. The victory at Blood River had made it all possible. By 1840, the Boers had also built a church to mark the victory, as they promised they would in terms of their Covenant.

One of the original cannon used at the Battle of Blood River. Despite having won the battle through the use of superior white technology, many Afrikaners clung to the belief that the victory was given to them by God.

Toward a Greater Understanding of Historical Forces

It was the scope of the victory which allowed the Battle of Blood River to enter the Afrikaner psyche as a divinely-inspired victory. December 16 did become a public holiday in Afrikaner-ruled South Africa, celebrated each year with large festivals, church services, and reenactments.

The Covenant became a Holy Grail in propelling Afrikaner nationalism. It represented the victory of European civilization over the darkness of Africa, of Christianity over the heathens.

It became the justification for white supremacy in South Africa, inexorably intertwined with the self-appointed right of Afrikaner nationalism to rule over, not apart from, the black tribes.

Yet the Battle of Blood River, in many ways, symbolized all that was wrong with the white settlement of Southern Africa, and why that experiment was doomed to failure.

While the Boers can be praised for seeking the peaceful settlement of unoccupied land, and seeking the friendship of neighboring peoples, the reality is that they and their descendants never understood the principle of demographics being the final arbiter in the fate of all nations.

Those who form the majority of the population in any given territory will rule that territory, no matter how militarily powerful any ruling elite might think itself.

This applies not only to the form of government, but also to all aspects of culture and society. A majority European population will create a society which reflects European values and norms.

A majority African population will create a society which reflects African values and norms. A majority Hispanic population will create a society which reflects Hispanic values and norms. A majority Japanese population will create a society which reflects Japanese values and norms, and so on, ad infinitum.

The Boers never understood this simple concept. Even at the Battle of Blood River they used at least sixty black servants, and an indeterminate number of mixed-race servants. Parker, one of the Scotsmen, had more than one hundred black servants with him just before the battle. Right to the present day, the overwhelming majority of Afrikaners keep their black servants: to work on the farms, the factories, and in their houses.

They fail to understand that by providing the native population with all the benefits of European civilization, they are enabling those racially alien groups to mushroom in numbers and demographically overwhelm their societies. This is the reason why the Cape Colony and the original Boer republics, which were all largely uninhabited by natives at the time of their initial settlement by Europeans, are today utterly overrun by tens of millions of Africans.

The Church of the Vow, built by the Boers in 1840 in terms of their Covenant, still stands to this day in the town of Pietermartizburg, named after Piet Retief himself.

Therein lies the rub: Pietermartizburg, supposedly the symbol of the Boer victory over the Zulus, is today part of the municipality called Umgungundhlovo—literally named after Dingaan’s capital. It is also the capital of the South African province of Kwa-Zulu Natal, and has a black population in excess of 95 percent.

The Church of the Vow, Pietermartizburg. The church built by the Trekkers after the Battle of Blood River still stands in central Pietermartizburg — a city now demographically overrun with the Zulus against whom the battle was fought.

The Church of the Vow stands alone, graffiti-scarred, abandoned, in a dirty downtown slum, ignored and forgotten. It stands decaying, symbolically illustrating the fatal error made by the victors of the Battle of Blood River, that of ignoring the demographic racial imperative.

The only way to maintain your civilization is to majority occupy your own land with your own people, and to do your own manual labor. This is the iron law governing the rise and fall of all civilizations, and the victors of Blood River ignored it, to their cost.

ES SAY SIX

When the West Looked Away: White Genocide in Zimbabwe

"These crooks [whites], really, we inherited as part of our population... We cannot expect them to have straightened up, to be honest people, and an honest community, all told... Yes, some of them are good people, but they remain cheats. They remain dishonest." - Robert Mugabe on BBC's *Talk about Africa* program, October 2000. (1)

"Whites are not human beings." - Joseph Msika, Zimbabwe's vice president, August 18, 2001. (2)

Zimbabwe—once upon a time one of the most prosperous Southern African nations, known as the "jewel of Africa"—has, since its transfer to black rule in 1980, been reduced to a shattered ruin.

It is unable to feed itself; whites and black dissenters alike are routinely murdered and tortured, and the high democratic ideals upon which that state was founded are dashed against a brutal campaign of hatred directed by Robert Mugabe.

Since the early part of 2000, Zimbabwe has been subjected to a widespread, organized, and extremely brutal campaign of intimidation, violence, and ethnic cleansing against whites, and a systematic campaign of terror against black Zimbabweans who have dared to oppose the Mugabe government.

This campaign of violence has been directly fanned and, in many instances, created by the Mugabe government.

Prompted by governmental failure to deliver economically, the Mugabe regime has resorted to picking on whites and dissenting blacks in an effort to shift the blame for their mismanagement onto a helpless minority. Gangs of self-styled "war veterans"—the vast majority are far too young to have fought in the Zimbabwean Bush war, which ended twenty-two years ago—have, with official government backing, simply seized a number of farms from commercial farmers and driven them off the land, claiming that they are colonialists and racists.

In fact, many of these farmers only started farming in Zimbabwe well after the handover of power to Mugabe and the disappearance of Rhodesia, and have no connection at all with Zimbabwe's distant past, but this minor fact has not stood in the way of Mugabe's bloodlust.

Zimbabwe is suffering its worst ever economic crisis. Hard currency shortages have caused gas stations to run dry. Cornmeal, the staple food, along with bread, milk, sugar and other commodities, is scarce and long lines have become commonplace. (3)

Inflation in Zimbabwe, spurred on by shortages and price controls on basic commodities, is now more than 231,000,000 percent. (4) Zimbabwe's finance minister, Simba Makoni, has admitted that Zimbabwe is bankrupt. *"No one is investing in the country, nor is there any likelihood anyone will, and there is no foreign currency available to import food,"* Makoni said in a rare display of honesty. (5)

100 000 RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE
50 000 RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE
10 000 RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE
5000 RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE
1000 RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE
500 RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE
100 RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE
50 RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE
20 RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE
10 RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE
5 RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE
FIVE DOLLARS
BEARER CHEQUE
RVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE 250 000 000
VE BANK OF ZIMBABWE 100 000 000
VE BANK OF ZIMBABWE 50 000 000
E BANK OF ZIMBABWE 25 000 000
VE BANK OF ZIMBABWE 10 000 000
E BANK OF ZIMBABWE 5 000 000
VE BANK OF ZIMBABWE 1 000 000
E BANK OF ZIMBABWE 750 000
VE BANK OF ZIMBABWE 500 000
RVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE 250 000
RVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE 200 000
TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS
BEARER CHEQUE

A lineup of bank notes shows Zimbabwean inflation — from Z$5 to Z$250,000,000.

ETHNIC CLEANSING OF WHITES

Typical of the Mugabe gang's tactic was the murder of the first two white farmers, David Stevens and Martin Olds, which took place in 2000.

Stevens, 48, who shared profits with workers at his farm in the Macheke area, about 100 kilometers east of Harare, was attacked on April 15, 2000.

He sought help from officers at the local police station. The mob of "veterans" stormed the police station and dragged him away in view of the several officers on duty who did nothing to stop him from being abducted and dragged into the bush, where he was tortured and shot dead at point-blank range with a shotgun in the face and in the back. (6)

The murder was officially sanctioned by Mugabe himself, who said that Stevens, a member of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), *"had it coming to him."* (7)

Not satisfied with the murder, Mugabe's officially endorsed gang then drained Steven's blood, mixed it with alcohol and drank it. (8)

Above: Farmer David Stevens, who shared farm profits with his black farm workers, was the first white farmer to be killed. His murderers then literally drank his blood, and Mugabe commented in public that Stevens "had it coming to him."

The Martin Olds case followed a similar pattern: According to his widow, Kathy Olds, who fled to the UK with two children, a suitcase, and £60 in cash after the murder, the campaign of terror against her husband carried official endorsement.

Their telephone was bugged, they were followed, a visitor had his car tires slashed, and her brother received death threats after he delivered the tribute at Martin's funeral.

The Presbyterian minister who delivered the sermon was harassed by the Zimbabwean police's detective division, the CID, and received death threats. (9) Olds was alone in the family farmhouse at Nyamandhlovu, 500 kms (300 miles) south of Harare, when about one hundred self-styled war veterans turned up to take over the land on April 18, 2000. He had received death threats, and had informed the local Zimbabwean police, who had refused to act. (10)

The "war veterans" then attacked Olds in his house, firing repeatedly and petrol bombing the homestead. According to his widow, Olds telephoned his mother, said that he had been surrounded, and asked her to call the police. She phoned the police on four occasions, but they did not react. (11)

The last telephone call Olds made to his mother was that he had been shot in the leg, and had made himself a splint for his leg. His request for medical attention came to nothing when the Zimbabwean police would not allow an ambulance to pass the roadblock they had set up outside the farm. (12)

Further evidence of the cold-blooded and premeditated nature of the Mugabe driven terror campaign came in March 2001, when Olds's mother, the sixty-eight-year-old Gloria Olds, was shot dead near the town of Bulawayo. (13)

Mrs. Olds was shot early one morning as she opened the gates of her house, dying in a hail of bullets from a machine gun, which also killed her three dogs. (14)

On December 12, 2000, a gang of "war veterans" gunned down a seventy-year-old white cripple, who was on crutches, Henry Elsworth, in Kwekwe, 200km southwest of Harare. (15) His son, Ian Elsworth, who was shot five times in the leg and the groin during the attack, said his father received numerous death threats in the months leading up to the murder and had even left the country briefly in the hope that tensions surrounding the occupations would die down. (16)

Terry Ford, the tenth white farmer to be killed, was actually trying to leave his property after being attacked by twenty "war veterans" when his vehicle was stopped a short way from his house. He was forced to get out of the car, and then shot execution style against a tree. (17)

When farmers are arrested, their families are subject to violence as well. In August 2001, six farmers' wives arrived at a police station in Chinhoyi to see their detained husbands and bring them clothes—and the police then set about assaulting the women. (18)

Above left and right: Terry Ford, alive and dead—the tenth white farmer to be murdered by Mugabe's thugs. He was killed while trying to leave his property after it had been seized by "war veterans."

BRITISH NATIONALS AND WHITES SINGLED OUT

The self-styled leader of the farm invaders, the "war veteran" Chenjerai Hunzvi, was one of Mugabe's most prominent supporters, personally leading militants in the invasion of more than 1,700 farms.

A Zimbabwean MP, Hunzvi publicly urged his followers in May 2000 to seek out " *British passport holders* "—whom he denounced as " *ruthless, cunning people* "—and force them to leave the country. (19)

Hunzvi's open and violent anti-British sentiments are not some aberration in Mugabe's Zimbabwe.

The ruling ZANU-PF's party politburo, headed by Mugabe, declared Hunzvi an official Zimbabwe hero in June 2001, shortly after the "war veteran" leader had died of AIDs. As a result, Hunzvi was buried in Zimbabwe's official Heroes' Acre. (20)

In his tribute to Hunzvi, Mugabe said that the dead man's " *leadership was particularly inspiring in that it came at an historic time.*" (21)

WHITE FARMERS "ENEMIES OF THE STATE"—MUGABE

Mugabe was even more blunt than his comrade Hunzvi. In April 2000, Mugabe said to a nationally televised audience in Zimbabwe that "*white farmers were enemies of the state.*" (22)

Mugabe added these choice words: "*Our present state of mind is that you (the white farmers) are now our enemies because you really have behaved as enemies of Zimbabwe.*" (23)



Hunvzi, a prominent Mugabe supporter and leader of the initial farm invasions. After dying of an AIDs-related illness, he was buried in Zimbabwe's Heroes' Acre.

"ENGLISH TO BLAME"—MUGABE

The real blame for the problems in Zimbabwe, Mugabe continued, was to be placed at the door of the *"English . . . who oppose my plans to redistribute white-owned land from the country's commercial farms to poor black families . "* (24)

Switching to Shona, his native language, Mugabe then also thanked the black veterans for occupying the farms. (25)

MUGABE'S BLACK VICTIMS

Although there can be no doubt that Mugabe's aim is to drive all the whites out of Zimbabwe, the reality remains that the overwhelming majority of his victims are black Zimbabweans, particularly those who have dared to oppose him politically.

The non-partisan Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum drew up a list of the identities of 142 victims of political violence in Zimbabwe since the present trouble began in 2000. This list includes 11 whites—and 131 blacks, the vast majority of them supporters of the opposition "Movement for Democratic Change" (MDC). (26)

In addition to these numbers, some 115 black farm workers have been killed by Mugabe's gangs—as opposed to the 11 white farmers. (27)

Apart from the many documented cases of torture and killings on Zimbabwean farms, numerous laborers have been rendered homeless, jobless, and without access to education and healthcare as farms have been abandoned and businesses closed.

According to the Zimbabwe Agricultural Welfare Trust (ZAWT), a nonpolitical, nonprofit organization designed to provide charity to blacks directly affected by the economic chaos caused by the Mugabe government's policies, since February 2000, about 1300 commercial farmers have been forced, under threat of death or violence to themselves and their workers, to cease farming operations. (28)

It is under these circumstances that at least 750 large-scale commercial farms, which represent over 45,000 farm worker families, have had to fully cease operations. (29)

This translates to well over 200,000 farm workers who have either lost their homes or their jobs since the Zimbabwe government enacted its land redistribution program. (30)

The loss in terms of dependents—wives, children—who are also now destitute is proportionally higher.

According to the ZAWT, the “war veterans” have subjected farm workers to physical assaults and torture, and have forced them to watch as others are attacked in front of them “as an example.” (31)

A large number of the wives and female children of black farm workers have been sexually abused by Mugabe’s gangs. (32)

The majority of displaced farm workers have nowhere to go. Countless thousands are now scattered widely around the farming areas, sometimes simply encamped along the roadsides with no facilities whatsoever. They join the estimated 600,000 “internally displaced” people in Zimbabwe. (33)

In the Karoi district, more than one thousand cases of assault on black farm workers by Mugabe gangs were reported to the police in the two month period of June and July 2000 alone. Not one arrest has been made. (34)

After farmers and black workers objected to the police inactivity in Karoi, they were told by the local police chief, Superintendent Mabunda, *“Do you want war? If you want war, I will bring troops and we can have war. I think we will have war today.”* (35)

In September 2001 alone, more than 11 people were confirmed killed, 61 disappeared, and 288 reported being tortured by Mugabe’s police or supporters—with the vast majority of the victims being black. (36)

“These figures are only part of the picture, the ones we can confirm with certainty,” said Anthony Reeler of the Amani Trust in Harare, which monitors human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. (37)

Up to forty people were murdered in political violence during the run-up to the June 2000 parliamentary election.

Since then, the Amani Trust estimates that twice that number have been killed. (38)

Torture, including beatings, electric shocks, and even mock drownings, is widespread, and is committed by the police, the self-styled war veterans, or by militants of the ruling ZANU-PF. (39)

Some farm workers on occupied land have been burned out of their homes that have then been looted. Many have been forced to attend political rallies where they were expected to identify MDC supporters among them. Opposition sympathizers were then beaten, or worse, as a warning to others. (40) To add insult to injury, Zimbabwe police have rounded up scores of former commercial farm workers, and forcibly returned them to the farms they fled after they had been driven off them by “ war veterans. ” (41)

It is not only white farms that have been seized, contrary to popular belief. Hundreds of war veterans in Matabeleland South have seized dozens of government farms parceled out to leading black Zimbabweans.

The seizure of black owned farms started in April 2002, and black victims have included well-known opposition supporters. (42)

Above: A white farmer lucky to escape with his life. Mugabe's thugs beat this farmer to an inch of his life as he was forced off his farm.

POLITICAL ORIGIN OF ZIMBABWE'S FOOD CRISIS

While it is true that all of Southern Africa experiences periodic droughts, there is no question in the minds of all objective observers that the food crisis in which Zimbabwe finds itself is directly attributable to Mugabe's seizure of commercial farmland. Prior to Mugabe launching the ethnic cleansing campaign against whites, Zimbabwe exported a range of food and was virtually self-sufficient with a thriving agricultural sector. (43)

Although Zimbabwe was once the breadbasket of Southern Africa, sharply reduced domestic food production has forced the country into dependence upon food aid. (44) By August 2002, some three thousand commercial farmers had been forced to

leave their farms. [45] By October 2002, there were fewer than five hundred commercial farmers left in Zimbabwe. [46]

In October 2007, the last of Zimbabwe's white farmers were driven off their farms. As a result, an estimated eight million of Zimbabwe's thirteen million people are threatened with starvation, according to the UN and other international bodies. [47]

In the Masvingo district, a BBC reporter was shocked to find thousands of Zimbabweans scratching in the dirt looking for roots to eat. [48] Other journalists have reported finding Zimbabweans eating rats, river silt, and poisonous roots in order to fill their stomachs.

Where food is available, it is distributed along political lines. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) says its members are left out from the food relief programs. The MDC's vice-chairman in Masvingo, Shaky Matake, said supporters "*are not being given food by the government. They are sometimes even denied the right to buy the food if it is available .* " [49]

The printing press of the opposition supporting newspaper, the Daily News, *was bombed by Mugabe supporters in 2001.*

DEMOCRACY SUSPENDED BY ITS NECK

Mugabe's grip on Zimbabwe has been strengthened by his total disregard for basic democratic norms. More than thirty black opposition supporters—members and officials of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)—were murdered by Mugabe's party supporters during the 2000 election alone. [50] Dozens of opposition MPs have been arrested or assaulted, had their homes attacked, or faced other intimidation since they were elected in June 2000. [51]

The farm occupations began in 2000, in spite of a referendum two months earlier in which Zimbabwean voters rejected a new constitution that would have allowed the seizure of white-owned farms without compensation. [52]

The opposition newspaper, the *Daily News,* had its printing press destroyed by a bomb in 2001. [53] At the beginning of December 2000, Mugabe told white farmers that if they did not drop their legal action over the land seizures, they would be expelled from the country. [54]

According to the Amani Trust in Harare, which monitors human rights abuses in Zimbabwe, the police have been purged of those suspected of disloyalty to the regime and are effectively another ZANU-PF militia. [55] The same applies to the army and Central Intelligence Organization, the Zimbabwean secret police which is solely accountable to Mugabe. [56]

Nor can people look to the courts with any confidence. Many magistrates are sympathetic to ZANU-PF or too intimidated to rule against the government. Judges

who make an independent stand have been forced to resign after threats to their lives and families. (57)

In March 2001, the Mugabe government forced the country's chief justice, Anthony Gubbay, to take early retirement after he had ruled against the forcible seizure of white-owned farms. (58) The Mugabe government has defied two court order to clear illegal squatters off private land. (59)

A Zimbabwean High Court judge, Ben Hlatshwayo, ignored an order by his own court barring him from moving onto a farm confiscated from a white family.

The owners of the farm obtained a High Court order in September freezing a government eviction notice on his property in Banket, sixty miles northwest of Harare on grounds there were errors in the notice. That order suspended the white family's eviction until the government revised the notice. It has not been reissued. (60)

However, Hlatshwayo moved onto the nine hundred-acre farm in December 2002, accompanied by a police escort. (61)

Mugabe's thugs, posing as "war veterans" (although many are far too young to have fought in the bush war of twenty-two years ago) kick in the door of a black farm worker's house during a farm seizure captured on film by the BBC.

The Human Rights Forum (HRF) in Harare, a coalition of ten groups, including the Amani Trust, Amnesty International, and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, published a report in August 2000, which stated the problem clearly: *"The rule of law has been replaced by rule by thugs. Armed militias roam the countryside assaulting people whose sole 'crime' is to support the opposition party. The victims receive little or no protection from the law enforcement agencies; worse, members of these agencies sometimes participate in the assaults."* (62)

"To retain power in the face of increasing opposition, Mugabe has been prepared to subvert the democratic process, the independence of the judiciary, the freedom of the press, and the professional neutrality of the police and the army. He has deliberately stirred up violence, race hatred, and political intolerance, and he has brought economic destitution to his country," said the HRF. (63)

While the government ignores the courts at will, it continually uses the law as another weapon against its opponents. The MDC leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, has faced subversion charges for warning Mugabe that if he attempts to hang on to power by force he might be removed by force.

Yet Mugabe and his ministers have repeatedly issued public death threats against their opponents.

The then Zimbabwean defense minister, Moven Mahachi, told a rally in 2000 that *"we will move door to door, killing . . . I am the minister responsible for defense, therefore I am capable of killing."* (64) In June 2001, Mugabe's foreign minister, Stan Mudenge, told trainee teachers: *"As civil servants, you have to be loyal to the government of the day. You can even be killed for supporting the opposition, and no one would guarantee your safety."* (65)

Human Rights groups reported that at least nineteen thousand cases of torture were reported to them ahead of the 2000 parliamentary elections. (66)

A poster at a Mugabe rally reveals the official attitude toward those who oppose the Mugabe regime.

ANC SUPPORT FOR MUGABE'S POLICIES

The clearest indicator yet of the South African government's future intentions with regard to "land reform" in that country, can be gauged from the ANC's reaction to the events in Zimbabwe.

South African labor minister, Membathisi Mdladlana, said in Zimbabwe on January 11, 2003, that his country *"had a lot to learn from President Robert Mugabe's program of land reform."* (67) Mdladlana's comments were trumpeted by Zimbabwe's state press as strongly supportive of Mugabe's land seizures. (68)

Writing in the *Business Day* newspaper of May 3, 2001, longtime liberal, John Kane-Berman, CEO of the SA Institute of Race Relations, accurately remarked that "SA's policy towards Zimbabwe is not neutral." (69)

South Africa has, Kane-Berman said, *"consistently endorsed his propaganda that land is the key issue . "* South Africa even sent its agriculture minister to Zimbabwe in August 2000 to discuss *"helping understand farmer settlement . "* (70)

In October 2001, SA Deputy President, Jacob Zuma, said Mugabe had *"convincingly explained his land policies . "* (71) In 2008, Zuma ousted Mbeki as leader of the ANC.

The ANC's foreign affairs spokesman, Ronnie Mamoepa, said of the expulsion of an outspoken journalist, Mercedes Sayagues, that SA had no reason to doubt Zimbabwe's explanation that it had nothing to do with press freedom. (72)

"Soon thereafter, the chief justice of Zimbabwe, Anthony Gubbay, was forced to retire , " continued Kane-Berman. *"But (SA) Justice Minister Penuell Maduna endorsed claims by his Zimbabwe counterpart that threats to the bench in Zimbabwe did not undermine its independence or the rule of law."* (73)

In March 2001, Frank Chikane, director-general in the South African

presidency, emphasized that SA supported the Southern African Development Community's view that there were no human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. (74)

Hand in hand—President Robert Mugabe meeting President Thabo Mbeki at Harare Airport, March 18, 2002. Mbeki, deposed as South African president and leader of the ANC by "radicals" within that party in 2008, is widely regarded as a 'moderate" in the ANC's hierarchy.

MATERIAL SUPPORT PROVIDED TO MUGABE

The ANC government is not only providing moral support to Mugabe, but active material aid as well. According to the *Zimbabwe Independent*, South Africa provides seeds, fertilizer, fuel, and transportation aid to Zimbabwe in terms of an aid package agreed in October 2002. (75)

The state-owned South African electricity and oil companies, Eskom and Sasol, supply Zimbabwe on credit. This is something others refused to do—and Eskom is owed hundreds of millions of rands as a result—with very little chance of ever being paid back. (76)

The cost has been borne by South African consumers, of whom whites make up the great bulk of paying users. On March 23, 2000, the South African government announced that Eskom was extending further aid to Mugabe by consolidating $14.4 million of its $20 million debt into a loan and rescheduling payment for the rest. (77)

South Africa supplies 40 percent of all Zimbabwe's imports and Zimbabwe literally lives on South African credit. (78) Predictably, the South African economy suffered. In a move which all observers linked to the ANC's support to Mugabe, the rand went into free fall, losing 25 percent in 2000 alone, (79) and continuing a steady slide ever since.

African support for Mugabe: The Pan-African New African *magazine, distributed across the continent, explains to readers in its May 2000 issue why Mugabe is right.*

BLACK AFRICAN SUPPORT FOR MUGABE

The support given to Mugabe extends even further than just South Africa. A meeting in Angola in December 2001 of African heads of state from the fourteen-nation Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), unequivocally backed Mugabe's leadership and refused to impose any sort of sanction against Zimbabwe. (80)

Responding to the results of the March 2002 elections in Zimbabwe, an event dismissed by the rest of the world as a sham, the head of the South African observation team, the ANC's Sam Motsuenyane, said the vote was legitimate, and the ANC has sent "warm congratulations" to Robert Mugabe. (81)

The racial divide was marked: all white western European countries and the United States dismissed the election as substantially unfree and unfair, while Mugabe's fellow African leaders rushed to show support.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) observer team in Zimbabwe announced, "in general the elections were transparent, credible, free, and fair." (82)

Nigerian presidential sources said the government of President Olusegun Obasanjo would urge Europe and the United States to join in accepting the results as announced. (83)

In Nairobi, another long-serving and controversial leader, President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, was more forthright, congratulating his Zimbabwean counterpart on the result. (84)

Tanzania's President Benjamin Mkapa applauded the result, calling Mugabe a champion of democracy and taking a swipe at powers such as Britain which led criticisms of the Mugabe regime. (85)

Namibia also conveyed its "warmest congratulations to His Excellency, Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe" (86) with Namibian president Sam Nujoma announcing his intention to start with a farm seizure program in his country as well.



This satellite photograph of Zimbabwe in early 2002 reveals the effects of the farm seizures: the distinct outlines of the farms which have been "seized" can be clearly seen as light eroded patches, in strong contrast to the as of then still "un-seized" farms. Since this photograph was taken, the situation has deteriorated

dramatically and there are now no legal white farmers left in the country. It is estimated by the United Nations that Zimbabwe, which used to export food, will have four million starving in 2009.

PETER HAIN, SOUTH AFRICA, AND ZIMBABWE—A STUDY IN HYPOCRISY

Despite this litany of murder and vicious anti-white racism, the world community apparently felt little compunction in organizing a world cricket competition in Zimbabwe, starting in February 2002. Peter Hain, a long-time extremist leftist who occupied several government posts in the Labour governments of both Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, remarked that cricketers should *"show some moral backbone"* and not play in Zimbabwe. (87) Blair himself went on to say that he could nc force cricketers not to play in Zimbabwe. (88)

This limp wristed remark contrasts strongly with Hain's own activities in organizing the anti-South African sports boycotts of the 1970s and 1980s, when he devoted himself to almost full-time activism in opposing South African sports tours of Britain. Born in Kenya in 1950, Hain grew up in Pretoria, South Africa. His parents were both activists for the anti-South African Liberal Party in that country, and close friends of the Hain family formed a small terrorist group, the Armed Resistance Movement (ARM). (89)

One of ARM's best known actions was a bomb that exploded at Johannesburg station in July 1964, killing two innocent passersby. A Hain family friend, John Harris, was arrested and convicted of planting the bomb. Harris's wife, Ann, and their young son, David, went to live with the Hains in the run-up to the trial. (90) The fifteen-year-old Peter Hain personally delivered the eulogy at the service for John Harris after his execution by the state. (91)

After the South African Police proved the links between the Liberal party and the banned SA Communist Party, the Hains left South Africa. His dislike for whites in Southern Africa engrained, Hain then went on to become a leading anti-apartheid campaigner in the UK.

Hain organized a pressure group, Stop the Seventy Tour (STST), and announced that he and a few others were going to force the cancelation of the 1968 Springbok rugby tour.

In fact, Gordon Brown signed on as Hain's Edinburgh organizer, (92) and the STST team chained themselves to the Springbok team's coach, glued the locks on the players' hotel rooms, and threw vivid orange smoke bombs onto the pitch for the benefit of TV cameras. As a result, Home Secretary James Callaghan canceledled the 1970 Springbok cricket tour to Britain. (93)

Hain's actions were in marked contrast to his—and the British government's assertion that it was powerless to stop the British team from taking part in the Zimbabwean leg of the ICC Cricket Cup. Cynics might be justified in pondering if Blair and Hain did not feel as strongly about Zimbabwe as they did about South Africa, because this time the "face of the oppressor" was black instead of white.

Zimbabwe Information Minister Jonathan Moyo told the state-run *Herald* newspaper that attempts to boycott Zimbabwe were part of a British attempt to *"keep cricket as a white and colonial sport"* and that as far as he was concerned, the British

"should do so alone because we are not interested in their rubbish." (94)

Above: Duncan Cook, a young white attacked on the street by a Mugabe supporting mob, who split his head open with a machete.

THE END IS NIGH

Zimbabwe is on its last legs, a far cry from the stable, self-sustaining and orderly white ruled Rhodesia of old. It seems clear that Mugabe will succeed in his efforts of finally driving all whites out of that country, and those who are not forced out will be likely to leave as the once prosperous nation descends into Third World oblivion.

The lesson for Western nations is clear: Zimbabwe and the growing presence of Third World populations in their countries is a portend of what may yet happen unless current immigration trends are not only halted, but reversed, in the very near future.

Sources:

(1) "Mugabe Blasts Whites," *Zimbabwe Standard (Harare),* October 22, 2000.

(2) "Mugabe is behind this. In Europe you call it ethnic cleansing," *The Guardian,* August 15, 2001.

(3) "Judge 'seizes white farm for self,'" CNN, January 10, 2003.

(4) "Zimbabwe's inflation rate surges to 231,000,000%," The Guardian, October 9, 2008.

(5) "Zimbabwe: From bread basket to basket case," Voice of America News, May 9, 2002.

(6, 7, 8) "Accused 'drank blood of white farmer victim,'" *The Telegraph,* October 26, 2002.

(9, 10, 11, 12) " Forced to flee Zimbabwe," BBC, July 4, 2000.

(13) "Upset over latest Zimbabwe farm death," BBC, March 5, 2001.

(14) "Violence haunts white farmers," BBC, March 9, 2001.

(15, 16) " Zimbabwean white farmer shot dead," BBC, December 13, 2000.

(17) "White farmer killed in Zimbabwe," BBC, March 18, 2002.

(18, 19) “Zimbabwean white farmer shot dead,” BBC, December 13, 2000.

(20) “Zimbabwe farm threat,” BBC, May 8, 2000.

(21, 22) “Hunzvi declared Zimbabwe hero,” BBC, June 6, 2001.

(23, 24, 25, 26) “ Zimbabwe President Mugabe labels white farmers ‘enemies,’” CNN, April 18, 2000.

(27) Honor Roll, Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum.

(28) Censor Bugbear, “Farm Deaths in Zimbabwe,” December 2002.

(29, 30) Background, Zimbabwe Agricultural Welfare Trust.

(31) “Zimbabwe farmers taken to court,” BBC, August 19, 2002.

(32, 33, 34) Background, Zimbabwe Agricultural Trust.

(35, 36) “Farm strike spreads as white man is killed,” *Telegraph*, July 25, 2000.

(37, 38, 39, 40, 41) “Zimbabwe dissidents pay big price,” *The Guardian,* August 20, 2001.

(42) “Zimbabwe police drive workers back to farms,” *Zimbabwe Flag,* May 14, 2002.

(43, 44) “Zimbabwe: Now veterans seize blacks’ farms,” *Financial Gazette,* Zimbabwe May 3, 2002.

(45) “Zimbabwe food supply threatened,” CNN, January 9, 2003.

(46) “Zimbabwe farmers taken to court,” BBC, August 19, 2002.

(47) Background, Zimbabwe Agricultural Trust.

(48) “SA minister hails Mugabe land grab,” *Daily Mail and Guardian,* January 11, 2003.

(49, 50) “Zimbabwe’s famished fields,” BBC, May 2, 2002.

(51) “Hunzvi declared Zimbabwe hero,” BBC, June 6, 2001.

(52) “Zimbabwe dissidents pay big price,” *The Guardian,* August 20, 2001.

(53) “Zimbabwe President Mugabe labels white farmers ‘enemies,’” CNN, April 18, 2000.

(54) “The perils of reporting in Zimbabwe,” BBC, January 9, 2002.

(55) “Farmer killed as Mugabe speaks of war,” *The Guardian,* December 14, 2000.

(56, 57, 58) “Zimbabwe dissidents pay big price,” *The Guardian,* August 20, 2001.

(59) “Upset over latest Zimbabwe farm death,” BBC, March 5, 2001.

(60) “Zim tensions high,” News 24.com, September 21, 2000.

(61, 62) “Judge ‘seizes white farm for self,’” CNN, January 10, 2003.

(63, 64, 65, 66) “Zimbabwe dissidents pay big price,” *The Guardian,* August 20, 2001.

(67) “SA can learn from Zim,” News24.com, January 10, 2003.

(68) “SA minister hails Mugabe land grab,” *Daily Mail and Guardian,* January 11, 2003.

(69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74) “Silence over Zimbabwe deafening,” *Business Day,* May 3, 2001.

(75) “Mbeki’s Nemesis: Mugabe and Nepad,” *Zimbabwe Independent*, November 29, 2002.

(76, 77, 78, 79) “Thabo Mbeki has propped up Zimbabwe’s dictator at great cost to the region and his own reputation,” R.W. Johnson, FOCUS 21, February 21, 2001, Helen Suzman Foundation, Johannesburg, South Africa.

(80) “Africa Gives Mugabe Last Chance out of Crisis,” *Financial Gazette*, December 20, 2001.

(81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86) “ANC congratulates Mugabe as world fumes,” AFP, March 13, 2002.

(87, 88) “Blair urges cricket boycott,” BBC, January 8, 2003.

(89, 90, 91, 92, 93) “Hain’s world,” *The Guardian*, February 10, 2001.

(94) “Zimbabwe hits back in cricket row,” BBC, December 30, 2002.

ES SAY SEVEN

Interviewed by the Flemish

In 2003, I was interviewed by an obscure Flemish magazine, the name of which I don't recall. The magazine vanished before they could publish the resultant text.

1. Mr. Kemp, please allow us to start with the most typical opener: could you please introduce yourself to our readership?

I was born in the British colony of Southern Rhodesia, of British national parents, in 1962. I was educated in South Africa, obtaining a degree in Political Science, International Politics, and Public Administration.

I was conscripted for four years in the South African military, serving in the South African Police doing extended counterinsurgency and riot control duties from 1985 to 1988.

Politically, I worked for the South African Conservative Party, which was the official opposition to the previous National Party government, and which opposed the surrender to the ANC. I'll have more to say on that later in this interview. I have also worked internationally as a journalist, political and economic analyst, and as a consultant.

2. Your name is mostly associated with the magnum opus *March of the Titans: A History of the White Race* .

a: Could you explain your motivations and perspectives in engaging in such a gigantic endeavor?

b: What has the reaction been?

a. I started writing *March of the Titans* with a completely different political outlook to that which I have now. When I started, I wanted to produce a document which told the white race's story, like Paul Johnson's *A History of the Jews* does for the Jews, or any of the many books which tell the story of the American Indians, or the Chinese, the Zulus, and so on.

It was only once the project was underway—and remember the basic manuscript took seventeen years, on and off, to complete—that I actually began to understand the lesson it could tell, rather than it just being a story.

As a result, my political views changed as well: from being a supporter of apartheid, I realized that that policy was one of the biggest threats to whites in Africa, and not their salvation.

I'll explain that a bit later, but for now, just let me say that a study of the white race's history made me realize that geographical separation, and not segregation, is the only political solution which can save Western civilization.

b. The reaction to the book has been 99.9 percent positive. My web site, www.white-history.com, and its assorted mirror sites, get well over one million hits every month, and I am flooded with positive email. Negative responses are so few and far between that if I had to put a percentage to it, I would say that I get one negative response for every one thousand positive responses.

On all other levels, the reception has been excellent as well. No less than three major universities have linked to my web site as recommended reading for their

students, and Discovery Channel TV has also used some of my material, with full acknowledgements, as has Irish television. Most recently I was approached by NBC to provide some material for a show they are making.

3. Could you transcend its main theme and conclusions to us? What lessons can thus be learned from the 350 centuries of tumultuous events?

The great conundrum I was presented with very early on in the book, was explaining why civilizations collapsed.

I remember asking my history professor at university (I started the book while doing a university course called "Cultural History of Western Europe") why it was that the Mesopotamian civilization had collapsed.

He gave me the obviously lame reason that "it had become tired"—and this sort of explanation, I found, was used over and over again in ALL of the history books I read. Every time a civilization vanished, the professors and books said it was because of economic exhaustion, military defeat, or moral decay, or some such equally made-up reason.

I couldn't understand this reasoning. After all, you would struggle to find a more morally corrupt lot than some of the kings of England (what about Henry VIII who started the Anglican Church because the Catholic one wouldn't give him a divorce), yet England hadn't collapsed.

If "military defeat" were the cause of the collapse of civilizations, why hadn't Germany, which had 80 percent of its cities flattened in World War II, also collapsed?

Economic exhaustion? What about the Great Depression of 1929 in America? That was an economic collapse unlike any other in history, but that didn't destroy America.

So I realized there had to be another reason—and one which the professors were too scared to touch, or which had been deliberately suppressed.

And of course, the key to everything is race. It became transparently obvious that each and every time a civilization vanished, so that today we only see the empty ruins of its buildings before us, it was because the founding population had vanished. Either they died out, or, as was more often the case, they were assimilated into other peoples or races.

This then, is the great lesson of history: a civilization remains intact and standing, no matter what economic system, no matter what natural disasters, no matter what military defeats or victories, only as long as it retains the biological nature of its founding population.

As soon as a nation loses the genetic basis upon which it was built, then the civilization which it built, "falls." Most often, it does not actually "fall" but simply changes as it is assimilated into a new race or people. This is an iron law of nature which applies equally to all races, and all nations. It is this effect: the rise and fall of civilizations according to their racial makeup, which is the final lesson of history, and one which *March of the Titans* taught me as well.

4. Aside from documenting the ascendancy of the white race throughout history, you are also associated with the defense of white communities residing in hostile Southern Africa. Don't you think this a dead end as critics say?

Well, the "ascendancy of the white race" is only half the story. The other half is its descent, time and time again, and always for the same reason: by allowing

nonwhite races into its territories to do the manual labor.

Once established in white territories, the nonwhites then use the technological benefits and white infrastructure to breed their numbers up and demographically overwhelm the host white populations, as I described above.

This has direct bearing on the second part of your question: whites in Southern Africa. Yes, it is a dead end. The Afrikaners, and other white communities in Southern Africa (including the Rhodesians, of which I am one) ALL made the crazy error of trying to rule by force, over millions of blacks, while using them as manual laborers.

It was a policy which was doomed from the start. The white communities in Africa were white supremacists when they should have been white separatists.

If the Afrikaners had put half the effort into creating a smaller "Afrikaner only" homeland than they did into creating the farcical black "homelands" then they would today be sovereign.

Instead, they were so addicted to their black laborers (even today you will struggle to find a white household in South Africa that does not have black domestic servants, not to speak of the supposedly conservative Afrikaner farmers, who all employ hundreds of black laborers each, and support those laborers' families as well) that they thought they could rule over a territory in which they were the minority.

They never understood the driving force of history: those who physically occupy a territory determine the nature of the civilization in that territory.

To be fair, I also never understood that until it became apparent to me while writing *March of the Titans,* and I, too, for a short while, believed that apartheid was something which offered white salvation. In fact, it guaranteed white downfall: all it did was ensure that the white areas of South Africa were flooded with blacks who were given work, food, hospitals, schools, etc., courtesy of the whites.

Those same whites were then baffled as to why black numbers increased to the point where it was not possible to "rule over them" anymore, and why the blacks, quite naturally, demanded the right to rule themselves. They did, after all, form the majority of the population.

In 1988 I attended a briefing for section leaders in the riot unit to which I was attached. We reviewed the "unrest reports," as they were called, for the previous day, and I realized that we simply did not have enough manpower to control the region to which we had been assigned, never mind the whole country.

White South Africa lost the demographic battle, and it was entirely the fault of the whites themselves, and not some outside conspiracy.

Even now, you get Afrikaner hard-liners who refuse to see this truth. Instead they blame the mythical "Illuminati" (which they believe to be a satanic organization), the "Communists," the "Jews," the 'traitors," or whoever—when in reality if they had not employed the nonwhites and had not been dependent on nonwhite labor, their country would never have filled up with nonwhites.

The Afrikaners lost demographic control of their own country because they were too lazy to do their own work.

The Afrikaners will only be saved by getting rid of their nonwhite labor, and by congregating in an area in which they will form the demographic majority. This means giving up their claim on the whole country, of course, as they simply don't have the numbers to majority occupy all of it.

While all this is theoretically possible, I have almost no faith that they are prepared to do either of these two vital steps, so, yes, the final answer to your question is that whites in Africa are indeed a short-term phenomenon, destined to be overwhelmed within a relatively short space of time.

5. You have also documented, both in text and pictures, the influence of the massive influx of African immigrants on European society. It is a very obvious fact. How come your research is so rare? What do you deem the driving force—if there is one—of the apparently thriving "death wish" among whites?

Quite simply, it has been the result of academic cowardice, driven primarily by fear of being called names and then also, in many supposedly democratic countries it's become a crime to mention race.

It always amuses me to see countries which claim to be so "democratic" and "anti-Nazi" actually using laws to suppress ideas in a manner which would have made the most "fanatical" Nazi Gestapo officer blush!

When I look at the way countries such as France fine and imprison people for simply suggesting that events in World War II were slightly different to that officially claimed, then I really can't think of such a parallel in Nazi Germany!

No one in Nazi Germany was ever imprisoned because they publicly disagreed with the Nazi interpretation of German history. In many ways, the so-called "democratic" nations are actually far worse in suppressing freedoms than the Nazi and fascist dictatorships which they claim to oppose.

As to the second part of your question, I think the biggest problem is the declining white birthrate. The vast majority of whites simply respond to circumstances, and do not play a major role in determining those circumstances. So, if the economy of a country is rigged up in such a way that single income families are impossible, you will see a decline in family numbers. It is not a deliberate "death wish," but rather people reacting to outside pressures.

Anybody who understands the seriousness of the situation is under an obligation to go out there and do something.

And by this, I do not mean some mindless random act, but rather positive, constructive, political activism which results in a change to the political system: for example, by forming credible parties which can be elected to positions of authority.

If we are in a position to substantially change the way society is structured, the majority of whites will respond by having larger families, and the racial crisis will be at an end.

6. Now let us deal with the criticism regarding *March of the Titans.* Some claim your historical vision is too "Nordicist," ascribing a near exclusive role to North Europeans in the building of civilizations. What is your reaction?

This criticism, from a tiny handful of people, is based on a deliberate misreading of the book. Anyone who takes the time to read *March of the Titans* will see that it goes into great detail about the abilities of all the European subraces.

In fact, there is a whole chapter devoted especially to highlighting the glorious achievements of the Mediterranean whites. Chapter four, "Laying the Foundations," deals exclusively with the marvelous white Mediterranean civilizations, without which, as the chapter title implies, the later civilizations would probably not have risen to their heights.

In chapter ten on classical Greece, one finds the assertion, backed by historical facts, that that civilization reached its zenith after both Nordics and Mediterraneans combined: *"By approximately 1000 BC, the waves of invading Indo-Europeans had started to come to an end, and a semblance of stability returned to central and western Europe.* ***Together with the original European peoples*** *, the new Nordic settlers built upon the Old European civilizations, with the first great 'city states' being built on the Greek peninsula."*

In chapter five, which deals with the founding of the classical Roman civilization, *March of the Titans* has the following to say: *" A tribe of Indo-Europeans called the Latini penetrated as far south as Italy, taking control of that peninsula and* ***mixing with the existing original European populations in Italy, and creating what was later to become the world's greatest empire—Rome. "***

Even in chapter eight which deals with ancient Egypt—one of my favorite chapters, by the way—which is provocatively titled "Nordic Desert Empire," the contents of the chapter make it very clear that the title refers only to the pharaohs themselves, and that the majority of the original Egyptian founding population were white Mediterraneans: *"Skeletal evidence from grave sites show that the original white Mediterraneans and Proto-Nordics were in a majority in the area."*

So, to repeat my answer to your question: the assertion by a tiny number of critics that *March of the Titans* says that only Nordics built white civilizations, is simply a lie, deliberately circulated to try and cause division within the racially conscious white community.

7. There have also been noted some disenchanted reactions from both Portuguese and Greek readers. They have difficulty with your assertion of a substantial nonwhite admixture in their blood as a reason for the downfall of their respective civilizations. How would you respond to these critics?

Let's deal with Portugal first. The most important thing to note is that nowhere does *March of the Titans* say that the Portuguese civilization has "fallen." Those are your words, and they are not used at all in my book.

All that *March of the Titans* says is that there is a racially mixed element in Portugal, which is the cause of that country's well-known illiteracy and poverty levels (the worst in Europe, even today, as a matter of interest), and which affected that country's ability to maintain its lead in the colonial race during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The accuracy of this statement has been confirmed several times in DNA studies undertaken in Iberia, so there is not even a debate over it.

Nowhere does *March of the Titans* say that Portuguese civilization has fallen, or that all people living in Portugal are of mixed racial ancestry. In fact, *March of the Titans* goes out of its way to say exactly the opposite, as a reading of the relevant chapter will easily show.

All that the book says is that there is an important part of the population which is of mixed racial ancestry—no more, no less. This assertion is, of course, borne out by the in-depth genetic research which has been done in that country, and which is freely available to anyone looking for it.

But there is nothing to get upset about here. M *arch of the Titans* also says, for example, that there has been an influx of Malay blood into certain parts of the

Netherlands during the colonial period. It also points out that there has been an influx of Indian blood into Britain during the colonial period, and that the Lapps in Scandinavia have also seen some assimilation into the Nordic populations in those countries. Furthermore it says that in Russia it is clear that certain Asiatic elements have been absorbed into the white populations, particularly in the south of that country.

There has been an element of racial mixing in almost every white country, and it is only the degree which varies. Yes, there has been racial mixing in Portugal following the slave trading era, but all that means is that there is a mixed race element in Portugal; it does not mean that all Portuguese are now of mixed ancestry.

The same applies, for that matter to modern Britain: just because there is now a mixed population there, it does not mean that all British people are mixed, even if the mixed race population is responsible for declining educational standards in that country.

As to Greece, we have to divide the history into classical and postclassical periods if we are to make any sense of the situation.

Most certainly, classical Greece fell. This is why today we see the empty ruins of its civilization—because the original founding population vanished, for the greatest extent. They were diluted through the importation of North African and Middle Eastern slaves, who demographically overwhelmed their society—and once again the genetic studies in that country overwhelmingly support the historical account.

In fact, the Romans, when they occupied Greece in 146 BC, were shocked at the ruination of the monuments and buildings of Greece, and much of the ruins we see today in that country are Roman restorations from that time.

The second part of Greek history—the postclassical period—saw large numbers of whites enter that land during the Roman and Byzantine periods and even later during Europe's wars with the Ottomans. Most modern white Greeks (and, of course, *March of the Titans* says very specifically that most modern Greeks are white) actually bear no genetic link to the Greeks of classical times. Those inhabitants of Greece who are descendants of the people of classical times show the very clear genetic effect of the cause of the collapse of that civilization. DNA studies have shown, for example, that up to one quarter of all Y-Chromosomes in modern Greece are non-European in origin.

In summary, *March of the Titans* asserts that classical Greece fell because the original founding population was racially displaced and the historical and genetic evidence bear this out.

It also asserts that there are white Greeks, alongside a portion of people who live in that country who are of mixed racial origin, in exactly the way described at length in the section on Portugal.

8. You seem to have delved into a lot of archaeological museums on antiquity. Your work draws from paintings, mosaics, and sculptures which demonstrate race in history. Are the artistic interpretations from 500 BC scientific proof? Isn't this approach somewhat similar to the Afrocentrist "historians" who conclude a Negroid pharaoh dynasty?

Yes, they are proof, in every respect, including those of the Afrocentrists who claim a Negroid pharaoh dynasty.

You see, each culture produces art works which mirror itself, especially from early time periods when people lived in relative isolation from one another.

For example, Chinese artists from 500 BC would produce images of people as Chinese, because that would have been the most obvious model from which they could work.

The same goes with all other cultures as well: their art would, to the largest degree, reflect the models upon whom they could base their works. So yes, a Mesopotamian statue with blue eyes would have been an accurate depiction of a person who spoke an Indo-European language, and who, according to the historical accounts, was an Indo-European settler in the Middle East. The same goes for statues of blue-eyed Persians, or red-haired Egyptians and so on.

As to your point about Afrocentrists using Negroid statues to prove Negroid dynasties in Egypt, they are absolutely correct. The ancient Egyptians were finally overrun by Negroes from the far south, and the Twenty-fifth Dynasty (circa 800 BC) was a Negroid dynasty, as were those which followed up until an even later Assyrian invasion.

It's only logical that statues of pharaohs made during that time would be Negroid in appearance since the artists would have tried to make the statues resemble the actual pharaohs. *March of the Titans*, chapter eight, has a few examples of such statues which the reader can view.

The point is, of course, that the advent of the Negroid dynasties came at the end of the Egyptian civilization—and inaugurated the collapse of that culture—something the Afrocentrists neglect to mention.

9. Another reaction we encountered to the magnum opus comes from Christians. Isn't this shooting yourself in the foot, or do you deem the role of organized religions so destructive than it merits the critique?

There are five aspects to the Christian question.

(a) First, an objective historical evaluation has shown that there is no contemporaneous evidence that any of the events as recounted in the Bible (be it the Jews' captivity in Egypt or the birth, life, and death of Jesus Christ) actually happened. Certainly, for example, there are no Roman records of Jesus, and this is unusual for that great record keeping nation.

(b) Secondly, Christianity was but one of many competing religions which became dominant in the late Roman Empire. After the fall of the western Roman Empire, it went into decline, and was only revived and forced on much of Europe by violent and bloodthirsty coercion, and not by peaceful conversion.

(c) Thirdly, the advent of Christianity plunged Europe into nearly one thousand years of the Dark Ages, during which most science, knowledge, and technical advancements were suppressed in the name of that religion.

(d) The terrible Christian Wars, fought between groups of fanatics who all claimed that they were the holders of the correct interpretation of God's word, caused such mayhem and destruction (killing, by many estimates, almost a third of Europe, and certainly a third of all Germany) that they are a blight on European history.

(e) Today, it is the same Christian churches in all white countries which stand at the forefront of anti-white activities, be it in actively opposing those political groups which are trying to stop the Third World invasion of European countries, or in

physically supporting and supplying Third World immigrants into European countries.

Given these issues, I did not feel this was a topic around which I could skirt or pretend did not exist.

10. You have also published a book on Eugene Terre'Blanche's Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging. Have you been involved in this organization? How should Europeans view them: as guerrilla fighters against an unjust dictatorship, or naïve fools with a too strong longing for booze?

I know Eugene Terre'Blanche and the AWB well, but have never been "involved" with them as an activist or office bearer.

As to your description of them: I think you are generalizing greatly. Certainly, there were some AWB people who were bad, but there were also many who were very good people, who risked all to try and save their nation.

Note that I write about them in the past tense: the AWB hardly exists anymore, even though they are at present trying to revive it.

As to what Europeans should think of them: I think Europeans should, instead of judging the AWB one way or another, just learn the lesson: that once you become a minority in your own country, you lose possession of it.

11. Please inform us on the present situation as it is evolving in Southern Africa.

South Africa today is a land of great contradictions. In some respects it is very First World, and in other respects very Third World. Apartheid created a First World bubble in the midst of a Third World continent, and it has some legacies. However, as the number of whites decline, the First World bubble gets ever smaller.

By 2008, more than a third of the total white population had already emigrated, and this shows no sign of slowing down. Added to this fact is the reality that the whites who remain behind are almost always those of the older generations; the emigration figures are continuously reducing the economically active and skilled elements of the country. It is estimated that the average age of white South Africans is already closer to fifty. This means that within a generation their numbers will drop dramatically, due to natural shrinkage, emigration, or simply being murdered out.

The extremely high crime rate is another indication that something is wrong. I don't believe, by the way, that the crime rate in South Africa is any higher than in Uganda or the Congo—only that the reporting infrastructure in South Africa is still better than in other African countries. There are, according to official figures, more than thirty thousand murders every year. At least three thousand of this annual total are white.

The crime rate is exacerbated by two factors: firstly, there are growing millions of unemployed and unemployable blacks in shantytown settlements, strangling all the major cities. Secondly, the whites are, by comparison, relatively wealthy, and therefore have more items which can be stolen. Between these two factors, it is a match made in hell. It would be bad enough if it stopped there, but it does not. The crime rate is accompanied by a vicious degree of psychopathic cruelty which regularly sees its victims gratuitously tortured before being killed.

Then there is the problem of growing black demands and numbers: for the millions and millions of average blacks living in shantytown, life is pretty miserable and is getting worse. They are bound to express their dissatisfaction politically, and the

ANC government will be forced by this increasingly radical support base to become ever more extreme.

This will inevitably result in the call for, and ultimate execution of the plans to seize remaining white assets, exactly as has happened in Zimbabwe. It is, as the Marxists say, a matter of historical inevitability.

12. Do you also deem it too easy an argument a posteriori to write off the white experiment in Southern Africa? You frequently have made the assertion that the project of white minority rule was bound to fail in a black majority continent. Where did it all go wrong?

Yes, white minority rule was bound to fail. Minorities can never indefinitely rule majorities by brute force. The majority of the population within an area always determines the nature of the society in that area.

It all went wrong, as I outlined above, when whites came to Africa as supremacists, and not as separatists. They didn't come to establish white countries: they came to establish white-ruled countries, in which millions of nonwhites would work, be given white technology, medicine, education, and then breed like crazy, eventually and inevitably dispossessing the white ruling class of political power. It is the classic example of how demography is destiny—and of how, if nothing is done, the same will happen in Europe.

13. We have detailed the history of the white race. Let us now turn to its future. What are our prospects in Europe with a negative population growth and mass Third World immigration?

If current trends continue—and this presumes that there is no political turnaround, which is, of course, what we all hope for and work for—then there can be no doubt that ultimately we will see a mixed race population dominating the former European lands, plunging the world, eventually, down to the level of pre-colonial era India.

In many countries: France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Britain, for example, already the racial balance teeters perilously close to this scenario.

The white race can only be saved by consolidating into an area in which it is the demographic majority. If this is possible at all, it might mean a new Great Trek. But we would all prefer the better solution: a political turnaround which will see the end of Third World immigration, along with the restoration of our nations' economic systems which will then stimulate our birthrates back to replacement levels.

Ultimately, the fate of our race lies in the hands of each and every person reading this, and not upon my predictions. If you, who are reading this, understand the message, understand the crisis, and do not go out and do something positive, something constructive, then you are abandoning your race and civilization. It is your duty to change society: no one else will.

ES SAY EIGHT

Conspiracies and the Chris Hani Assassination

When I saw the 1991 Oliver Stone movie *JFK* which deals with an alleged conspiracy surrounding the assassination of John F. Kennedy, I must admit that, at the time, I thought that Stone—and by implication, the JFK conspiracy theorists—had made quite a good case. It seemed, on the face of it, that there was probably something more to the case than the public record suggested.

Certainly the odd quirks highlighted in that movie—buildings with two entrances, the peculiarities of the much vaunted "grassy knoll" shooter and other things were intriguing enough to sow a seed of doubt in my mind. Maybe there was something bigger behind the assassination, rather than just a lone nut. It was a possibility I seriously considered.

My belief in this sort of thing was completely shattered in a few years' time due to the events which surrounded the assassination of Chris Hani in 1993. Hani was possibly one of the most senior and important figures of the African National Congress's "armed struggle" against apartheid South Africa and certainly the most popular political leader amongst black South Africans after Nelson Mandela.

A scene which shocked South Africa: ANC bigwig Tokyo Sexwale covers the face of Chris Hani with an ANC flag as he lays in his driveway after being assassinated.

He was gunned down during the Easter weekend, 1993, by a white assassin as part of a plan to provoke wide scale unrest and to set the stage for a military coup d'état in South Africa. This would have, so the theory went, prevented the ANC from coming to power (an event which occurred the next year). It was only with the assassination of Chris Hani, the details of which I became intimately acquainted, that I experienced firsthand how mad many people are, and how they twist, distort, and even make things up when the conspiracy bug gets a hold of them.

I realized then that apparently the plain truth was too boring for many people, and that some darker instinct propelled them to seek out bizarre theories or

suggestions which implied that all was not as it seemed.

Why else do people persist in saying the moon landings never happened, or that it was missiles which flew into the Pentagon and the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001?

And so it is with the Chris Hani assassination. It was unquestionably one of the most sensational political murders in South Africa since that of former Prime Minister HF Verwoerd (stabbed to death in 1966). The truth surrounding the Chris Hani assassination has obviously proven to be too "dull" (although I never experienced it as that) for both the far left and the far right.

As a result, conspiracies have abounded. I am always astonished to read of some new invented twist to the story. I have read that there was a second car with a second gunman, that there were additional bullet holes in the wall next to the assassination scene, that the assassin was actually a Communist sleeper agent working to "smear the right wing," and (the most common one) that there was some combined conspiracy between the apartheid state and a "right-wing" faction of the ANC.

This latter conspiracy belief—that a so-called right wing of the ANC (incredible as that may sound) joined forces covertly with the apartheid security establishment to kill Hani, who was seen as a "radical," runs rampant to this day in the ranks of the South African Communist Party. Consequently they regularly call for the case to be reopened so as to "discover the truth."

The great thing about conspiracy theories, I found, was that people take some ordinary mundane fact, and attribute to it a meaning way beyond anything it actually signifies. From there, they build it into the overall fantasy which they seek to believe.

Small snippets of half-truth have been woven together to produce what can only be best described as a tapestry of lies.

The reason for this is, I believe, twofold: firstly, it satiates this "dark desire" for conspiracy nonsense; and secondly, and far more practically, it has been used to help deny amnesty in terms of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission to the perpetrators of the assassination (although, to be fair, this was not the sole reason for them being denied such amnesty).

In order to set the scene for the dramatic events of Easter 1993, it is first necessary to spell out the background in some detail. This is not done to try and provide any sort of biography, but each subsection below contains information vital to understanding the assassination itself, so I beg the reader's indulgence for a short while.

Chris Hani—A Short Bio

Chris Hani was, without doubt, the second most popular figure in the ANC hierarchy after Nelson Mandela. Born in 1942, he had joined the ANC at age fifteen, and had devoted his life to that organization.

When the ANC was banned by the apartheid South African government in 1960, he joined the armed wing of the ANC, called Mkhonto we Sizwe ("Spear of the Nation") but was arrested under the Suppression of Communism Act.

After his release, he went into exile in neighboring Lesotho in 1963, from where he was sent to receive military training in the Soviet Union. He took active part in the armed uprising against the white government of Rhodesia, and served in campaigns in the Rhodesian Bush War.

Due to his extensive hands-on military experience, he was eventually appointed head of Mkhonto we Sizwe, which he commanded from ANC headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia. There he, along with Yossel Mashel (Joe) Slovo, was responsible for running the ANC's armed campaign against the South African state. Because Hani was recognized as the militant face of the organization, he grew in stature amongst supporters of the ANC.

When both the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) were unbanned in 1990, Hani returned to South Africa. There he took part in the negotiations with the government to bring an end to white rule. He was also elected secretary-general of the now legally reconstituted SACP, replacing Slovo, who was made party chairman. The SACP had been in formal alliance with the ANC since the 1950s.

Winnie Mandela, Nelson Mandela, and Yossel Slovo at an ANC rally shortly after Mandela's release from prison.

My National Service in the South African Police

While being a hero to the ANC masses, Hani was close to the devil incarnate to many whites. It was truly a case of one man's freedom fighter being another man's terrorist.

Although by this stage I had long realized that apartheid was a disaster and had to go, I had not forgotten that in 1987, ANC guerrillas, working under Hani's direct command, had nearly killed me at the Johannesburg Magistrates' Court.

At that time I was halfway through fulfilling my national service. At the time, all white males of military age in South Africa were conscripted into the army or the police. I was conscripted into the police, and served in the uniform branch attached to John Vorster Square (now Johannesburg Central Police Station).

There I first did patrol work in the city, and later with Unit 19, the mobile Reaction Unit which dealt with the all too frequent flare-ups of unrest and insurgency around the country.

It was common for many policemen working at John Vorster Square to walk the three blocks to the Johannesburg Magistrates' Court canteen for lunch. ANC guerrillas had reconnoitered the Magistrate's Court and had seen that at 12:30 each day a number of policemen walked past the western side of the court building. The ANC men set two explosives: a small limpet mine to draw even more policemen in as they cordoned off the area, and a larger device hidden in a car which was designed to

inflict casualties upon the policemen.

The plan worked well, from the ANC's point of view. Three policemen were killed outright by the blast, including my personal friend, Weyers Botha, who, despite his Afrikaans-sounding name, was, like myself, an English speaker. I had known Weyers since we were both in the same platoon at the Police College in Pretoria in 1985, and had befriended him as the only other Englishman around at the time.

I would no doubt have been there as well, had a colonel not sent me on an errand for him at 12 o'clock exactly. The errand, I recall, was one which made me angry: it was to go and hand in his membership renewal forms for his tennis club. I, as a lowly sergeant, could not refuse the order even though it blatantly breached private use of state vehicle regulations, because it would have caused trouble for me later. I stalked out of the station fuming, because I knew that I would be late for lunch and in all probability miss it that day.

I was right: I did miss lunch—and the bomb. It was the luckiest errand upon which I have ever been sent. I would have been walking with Weyers, and unquestionably would have been killed with him.

So, to be honest, I was hardly sympathetic to Mkhonto we Sizwe, even though I knew apartheid had to go. The Johannesburg Magistrates' Court bombing always remained fresh in my memory, and the loss of a friend in such a manner was quite stressful.

Working at *The Citizen* Newspaper

I suppose I was not too bad a policeman. As I neared the end of my period of national service, I was asked by my commanding officer to join the force permanently. I refused, and bought my discharge on the exact day that my national service ended. By then, I had realized the game was up, and that as powerful as the state was, it could never hold out indefinitely against the ANC.

I went to work as a journalist at *The Citizen* newspaper in Johannesburg. I suppose I was not too bad a journalist either, because within a very short period of time I was given major stories to cover, more often than not writing the front page lead story. It was much better than walking the beat as a policeman, and certainly a lot safer than Unit 19's dangerous counterinsurgency work, but it was quite poorly paid.

After a while, the chief photographer on the paper, a good friend of mine named Wessel Oosthuizen, approached me and asked if I was interested in working for the Conservative Party.

That party was a breakaway from the ruling National Party, and opposed the handover process to the ANC. Although I was uncomfortable with the pro-segregation or petty apartheid policies of the Conservative Party (CP), I was strongly against the looming ANC handover so I accepted the job offer, which had come through Wessel directly from the party secretary, Andries Beyers. Maybe, I thought, the handover to the ANC could be politically averted.

Working for the Conservative Party

So it was that I moved to Pretoria to work in the CP head office. As the only English speaker in the entire building, I was a bit of an outsider, even though my colleagues never made me feel such.

It was, however, refreshing to meet Clive Derby-Lewis, another English-speaking South African. Although he was born in South Africa (unlike me), he was the

image of a stereotypical upper class Englishman, complete with handlebar moustache.

Clive was a tireless CP campaigner, and was ably assisted by his Australian-born wife, Gaye. Together they virtually ran the party in Johannesburg, and were much used in the more English-speaking parts of the country such as Natal and the Western Cape to try and entice more non-Afrikaners to join.

I got on particularly well with Gaye, finding her to be ultra-intelligent and outgoing, and a refreshing change to the other staid and highly conservative women activists in the party. Also, she wrote the four page English supplement to the party's weekly newspaper, *Die Patriot* ("The Patriot").

I was helping to write the rest of the paper (which was in Afrikaans, under the editorship of ZB du Toit), and I used to work quite closely with her on a number of projects.

One of these which we discussed at length was an exposé on the fabulously rich lifestyles of the ANC leadership now that they were back from exile. Gaye had, in fact, written about what she called the "Gucci revolutionaries" for nearly a year prior to this in various articles in the *Patriot* .

Mandela, for example, once released from prison, spent less than a week in his old Soweto house before moving into a fabulous mansion in northern Johannesburg. Communist Party guru Joe Slovo acquired a distinctly middle-upper class house in the fairly plush eastern Johannesburg suburb of Observatory, well away from the masses for whom he claimed to tirelessly work.

Chris Hani, for his part, bought a house in Dawn Park, out on the East Rand. Although nowhere near as ostentatious as Mandela's palace or Slovo's luxury dwelling, it was still a nice, large property, and more importantly, smack bang in the middle of what was then a largely white Afrikaner suburb in the CP controlled town of Boksburg.

In fact, the council ward which included Dawn Park was represented in the city hall by a CP man. The Boksburg town council was the main prize in the Conservative Party's quest for power at local government level. It was the third largest single council in the entire country (only Johannesburg and Pretoria were bigger) and flew the Boer Republic flag from its flagpole in front of the city hall. It was, therefore, a strange place to choose to live for someone who was leader of both the ANC's armed wing and the Communist Party, and it would doubtless make a fine story, as Gaye and I both agreed.

Gaye had also, through a contact of hers in the tax office in Pretoria, acquired a complete printout of Mandela's tax returns since being freed from prison, which showed that although he was now mysteriously worth millions, he had paid no tax at all. This, we thought, contained the elements of a really powerful story, and we fully intended to make a real splash of it.

Expelled from the Conservative Party

As so often happens, fate then intervened while we were planning our exposé. After the CP had won a by-election in the southern Transvaal town of Potchefstroom (the winner was none other than Andries Beyers, who had originally employed me), the government called out a referendum in March 1992 to ask the white voters if they supported the reform program or not. The results of that referendum, and its causes, are the subject of an earlier essay in this book. Suffice it to say that over two thirds of

the white voters endorsed the reform program, and only a third opposed it.

In practical terms, this meant the end of the road for white parliamentary politics. It was clear that there would not be another election for the white parliament, and that the reform process would proceed until there was a one-man, one-vote election. This would inevitably result in an ANC government.

The CP leadership was aghast. I remember seeing the leader of that party, Dr. Andries Treurnicht, on the morning after the referendum, in his office. He asked me, in all sincerity, if the whites had gone mad.

I answered that it seemed so—I just did not feel like telling him that because the party had fought the campaign on a pro-apartheid platform, when it was obvious to all and sundry that apartheid was an unworkable disaster, defeat had been guaranteed.

I was not the only one in the party to feel that way. My good friend, ZB du Toit, the party newspaper editor; Andries Beyers, the party secretary; and a small number of Conservative Party members of parliament, all agreed that apartheid had failed and that a new policy was needed if the Afrikaners were not to be drowned in a unitary state.

That new policy was to stop trying to dominate all of South Africa, and instead, by whatever means possible, create a smaller territory, majority inhabited by Afrikaners. This was called, in Afrikaans, the "Volkstaat" concept, or the "Peoples' State"—it translates horribly into English.

A clear internal split then developed within the Conservative Party: those, under the leadership of Treurnicht, who still believed in apartheid, and those who believed it was an idiotic policy and had failed utterly. I was amongst the latter.

A month and a half after the referendum, I was the guest speaker at the May 1992 annual meeting of the Coburg, Germany, branch of the Deutscher südafrikanischer Gesellschaft (DSAG, the "German South Africa Society"). The DSAG was a body funded by the South African department of Foreign Affairs which was designed to foster good relations with Germany (difficult in the time of apartheid).

Because some members of the DSAG in Coburg were also members of the more overtly (but separately organized) right-wing Hilfskomitee Südliches Afrika (HAS: "Help Committee for South Africa"), extremist leftists later seized upon my appearance at this function to claim that it was some type of right-wing event, which it was not.

Speaking to a hall full of Germans eager to know what was going to happen to South Africa after the referendum, I told them that apartheid was finished, and that unless the CP changed its policy to support a Volkstaat, it would vanish from the pages of history, along with all white politics in South Africa.

Members of the visibly shocked audience then asked me what about the Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB) which had won worldwide notoriety with its quasi-swastika flag and parades of brown shirted men. Would the AWB, I was asked, not fight a handover to the ANC?

I answered that although the AWB had, in theory, sixty thousand men in its "armed wing," it was my prediction that only a tiny handful would ever do anything, and the rest would vanish if it came down to a fight.

I predicted that a small number of AWB activists would resort to violence, but that this would be short-lived and the whole thing would peter out after they had all

been arrested. I was completely correct in all the predictions I made at this conference. I was later given credit for this by people who at the time were less than impressed, including Clive Derby-Lewis, who remained firmly supportive of the apartheid policy. (An interesting aside to this DSAG meeting was that my speech, which was delivered in English, was recorded and translated into German. The overenthusiastic translator took my words which "predicted AWB violence" into meaning—in German—that there "must be AWB violence."

It was a translation error which would allow me to be accused of encouraging violence, something I certainly never did, especially in a foreign country which has very strenuous laws on those things.)

Upon my return to South Africa, I found that news of my speech which called for a change in CP policy had sped back faster than myself. The pro-apartheid faction of the party, still by far the largest segment, took action against all of us. They expelled a number of members of parliament, including Andries Beyers, who had won the Potchefstroom seat by overtly campaigning on a non-apartheid platform. ZB du Toit, editor of the party paper, was also expelled.

Back with *The Citizen* Newspaper

Beyers went off to start a new short-lived party—the Afrikaner Volkstaat Beweging (AVB) which went nowhere and dissolved in short order. ZB du Toit managed to get a job with the Afrikaans Sunday newspaper *Rapport*, while I managed to get my old job back with *The Citizen* newspaper.

Doubtless that paper's editor, Johnny Johnson—who was conservative, but not CP supporting—felt some sympathy for me. Not only did he give me my job back, but he also paid me what the Conservative Party had been paying me, which was three times the salary at which he had first employed me only a short while before.

Although I had, therefore, politically speaking, fallen out with Clive Derby-Lewis and his colleagues, I remained friendly with Gaye, and would meet up with her from time to time on a purely social level.

I had been branded a "rebel" who did not believe in the perfectness of apartheid, so that more or less finished any political activity for me in CP circles. I quickly rebuilt my journalistic career with *The Citizen*, and it was there where I was introduced to another character who would bizarrely feature in the Hani drama. Gerry Pieterse was an affable chap who had previously worked as a subeditor on *The Citizen*.

One day while sitting at my desk with a story (the details of which dealt with the arrest of an ANC activist by the police) which the paper's editor had refused to run (not uncommon in newsrooms), a colleague sitting next to me told me to "phone Gerry and ask him if he wants to buy it."

Baffled, I asked who Gerry was. I was told that he was an ex-journalist who ran a press wire service and who regularly bought stories "spiked" by news editors. I checked it out with my old friend Wessel Oosthuizen, who still worked at the newspaper, and he confirmed that he not only knew Gerry Pieterse, but that he had also sold him stories, particularly on the AWB, which Johnson had refused to run. (Wessel was personal friends with the AWB leader, and was also a founding member of the CP and hence had personal contacts in the leadership of both groups.)

I gave Gerry Pieterse a call, and lo and behold, he snapped up my otherwise rejected story for, I think R200, which was a going rate at the time for freelance

stories.

It transpired that Gerry Pieterse's wire service, International Press Services, had stringers, or part-time journalists, supplying it with copy from all over the country.

He bought stories from journalists from almost every newspaper, including *The Citizen's* parliamentary reporter, and, much to my (later) interest, Anton Harber, who was also the editor of the Johannesburg *Mail and Guardian*— formerly *The Weekly Ma* — which was subsidized by the left-wing *Guardian* newspaper in Britain.

I got to know Gerry quite well, and would fairly regularly sell him stories which either were too controversial to appear in *The Citizen*, or which would appear later. The latter was a trick that Wessel Oosthuizen taught me: write a story, sell it to Gerry on Monday, and then hand it in for publication in *The Citizen* on Tuesday. Gerry never seemed to mind, happy with the fact that he had the story first.

The List Is Made

After a while, Gaye asked me, during one of our periodic chats, if I could supply her with any addresses of ANC leaders. We had earlier discussed the much postponed exposé story again, and I said this would not be a problem. She then faxed me a list of names, about nineteen in total, I recall, when I was in *The Citizen* newsroo one day.

Apart from the ANC leaders, the list included some well-known left-wing journalists who I presumed would be subject to the same exposé treatment. From my journalistic contact book I had the details for nine of the names straightaway.

The one address I did not have was Joe Slovo's. This was simply because I had never interviewed him in the course of my work, and not for any other particular reason. I did, however, find a description of his house as published in *The Star* daily newspaper, which I copied out, adding a remark that with a "bit of legwork" the house could easily be identified from the street. I never for a minute thought how this would later be interpreted, of course, but had merely meant that if Gaye wanted to walk around the relatively few streets of the suburb of Observatory, the house should be easy to spot.

The Citizen newspaper itself had earlier run a feature on Mandela's huge house in the suburb of Sandton, and had included a photograph and description of the gates. I cut the picture out of the paper and included the description of the gates and guards, thinking this would be perfect for an exposé showing how the ANC president was effectively shielding himself from his followers, and, more importantly, that this would highlight the crime wave for which South Africa has become famous. Chris Hani was also on the list—but his address was well-known, being listed openly in the East Rand telephone directory.

I distinctly remember not being surprised that Thabo Mbeki (later to be vice president under Mandela and then afterward president in his own right) was not on the list, even though he was a very senior ANC member. The reason was, I concluded, that he lived very modestly in a somewhat decrepit block of flats in Hillbrow, central Johannesburg, and could hardly be accused of being a highflier.

Compiling all this data into a printout on my computer, I then gave the list to Gaye at the Rotunda bus station in central Johannesburg.

A few weeks later, I wrote a story for Gerry Pieterse, saying that the right wing was collecting the addresses of well-known ANC people and left-wingers with the

intention of holding demonstrations in front of their houses to highlight the discrepancies between their lifestyles and that of their followers.

The Flight of Coincidence

In February 1993, I flew to London on a South African Airways flight as a part holiday and part expedition because I was considering immigrating to the UK.

As the aircraft's passengers lined up at passport control at Heathrow, I was surprised to meet an old acquaintance of mine, Phillip Powell. I had met Phillip while he was a student at the University of Pietermaritzburg, and I at the University of Cape Town. Phillip had, I knew, later joined the Security Police, and had worked in Natal against the ANC. After leaving the police, he had joined the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party, and had allegedly married a nonwhite girl. I had long since lost contact with him and thinking (probably correctly) that he would misinterpret my politics, had not bothered to try and contact him again.

As I was chatting with Phillip, he remarked what an amazing flight it had been, as between us the "entire political spectrum" had been present on the aircraft. I didn't know what he was talking about until he motioned to the front of the line, where the first class passengers were standing. There stood Chris Hani. I laughed and said that it was an interesting flight indeed. I then asked Phillip for his contact number and said I would call him. I never did.

The Assassination

I was at home in Benoni on the East Rand on Saturday morning, April 10, 1993, when I received a call from a friend who breathlessly gave me the news that Chris Hani had been shot.

It was quite shocking news, and I immediately saw the potential political implications: if the ANC masses rioted, the security forces would be forced to intervene and an all-out civil war might then ensue.

As evidence later transpired, Hani was gunned down in the driveway of his home at 10:20 a.m. He had just returned from a local corner store to buy a newspaper and had got out of his car when a red Ford Laser driven by a white male pulled up behind him in the driveway.

Only calling out his name, "Mr. Hani"—at which Hani turned round—the man then stepped out from his car, pulled out a 9mm pistol and shot Hani once in the body. The assassin then stepped forward very close to Hani and shot him a further three times in the head. He calmly got back into his car, reversed out of the driveway, and sped off in the direction of the Boksburg city center.

However, a neighbor, an Afrikaner woman by the name of Retha Harmse, just happened to pull out of her driveway at the instant that the shots were fired, and managed to note down what she thought was the assassin's license plate number. She ran back into her house and telephoned the police, giving them the number. Although the number she had noted down (PBX 137T) was not the number on the assassin's car (PBX 131T), it was close enough to provide the vital clue which enabled the police to arrest him ten minutes later on the main road passing the Boksburg city hall. Alert policemen on patrol spotted the car moving through traffic and pulled it over.

Inside they found Janus Jacub Waluz, a Polish immigrant. They also found a pistol, a silencer, and adhesive numbers which were used to make temporary number plates. It was later established by the police that Waluz had used one of the adhesive

numbers, a seven, on the last number of his license plate, changing it from PBX 131T to PBX 137T during the actual assassination.

I knew none of this at the time, and was sitting at home contemplating the bare details of what I knew, when the phone rang again. This time it was my old friend ZB du Toit, who was working in *Rapport's* Pretoria offices.

He asked me if I had any idea who had shot Hani. By that stage, the assassin had already been arrested, but the police were not releasing any details. All of the newspapers were scrabbling to try and find out who it was.

I truthfully told ZB that I had no idea who had done it. ZB told me that all they knew at *Rapport* was that the assassin had been driving a red Ford Laser car. That rang a bell with me: I knew that a Polish immigrant right-winger, who I just knew as "Kuba" drove a red Ford Laser, and he seemed pretty militant.

I had met Kuba three or four times previously, never getting to know him well enough to learn his surname. I knew little more than the fact that he was one of Clive Derby-Lewis's friends.

I told ZB that I would make inquiries and get back to him if I found out anything. I then called another old friend of mine, Willem Olivier. Amongst his exploits, Willem had been the private secretary to the National Party Prime Minister HF Verwoerd.

More importantly, Willem had been secretary-general of the AWB and was, I knew, friends with "Kuba." I was lucky to catch Willem at home. I asked him if Kuba drove a red Ford Laser, just to check if my memory was correct. He confirmed I was right. I then told Willem that I suspected it was Kuba who had shot Hani, as I knew him to be militantly anti-Communist. Willem confirmed that it would not surprise him.

I then asked Willem what Kuba's real name was. He told me it was "Jan Waluz." Armed with this information, I called ZB back and said I suspected that it was a Polish immigrant in Pretoria named Jan Waluz. ZB thanked me for the tip, and asked me how I had found it out.

I did not want to tell him that Willem Olivier had provided the information, so I invented a story saying that I had called up an old policeman friend of mine who worked on the East Rand police and he had told me.

ZB promised that if the information was correct, I would get a tip-off fee from the paper—and one for my "policeman friend." I did not have the heart to tell him there was no policeman but that it was just a good guess on my part, based on the most circumstantial of evidence.

As it turned out, one of the photographers working at *Rapport's* Pretoria office was also Polish, and as émigré communities tend to be tight-knit, she knew almost all of the Polish community in that city personally. Much to ZB's surprise, she knew Jan Waluz and was able to take him straight to his residence, an apartment in the city. There they found the apartment already cordoned off by police. It was him.

Obtaining a photograph of Jan Waluz from his immediate family, ZB was able to scoop the world's media the next day by publishing a photograph of the assassin. ZB later told me that this was the journalistic scoop of his career, and that he "owed me one."

I told him not to bother, as by then *Rapport* had already paid me the substantial "tip-off fee" times two, once for me and once for the mythical "policeman" friend.

The only mistake had been in the spelling of the name: ZB had used the name I had given him in the story, "Jan Waluz," when in fact the correct spelling was Janus Waluz.

No one noticed in the flurry which followed, although during the later trial, the advocate general, Klaus von Lieries und Wilkau, tried his level best to find out how *Rapport* had got hold of the name. I was present when Von Lieries demanded one of his subordinates to find out. I volunteered no information.

The Trail Leads to Clive Derby-Lewis

When Janus was taken into detention, he initially denied all knowledge of the assassination, and of how the weapon and other items came to be in his car. He then, however, made a verbal confession of his actions to a policeman who he thought was a right-winger.

In this verbal confession he told the police that although he had committed the act by himself, Clive Derby-Lewis had helped by providing the weapon. The policeman to whom he told this was no right-winger, and he promptly reported Janus's conversation to the investigating officer in the case.

Forensic tests established that the fatal bullets had indeed been fired from the gun found in Janus's possession. Cordite was found on a pair of gloves which were in the car, indicating that he had just fired some shots; and blood, the group type of which matched Hani's, was found on his clothes.

A search of Janus's apartment found a printout list of names, which had been numbered by hand in an apparent order of priority—with Hani listed as number three.

Once Janus's name had been publicised by *Rapport*, the other newspapers immediately set their investigative reporters on the case. They dug up all the information they could about him, and soon discovered the close association with Clive Derby-Lewis. More importantly, they also announced that a "hit list" had been discovered at Janus's apartment.

I began to get a bit worried. Given the fact that Janus knew the Derby-Lewis's so well, what if the list to which the police referred was the one I had earlier given to Gaye? I needed to know.

I drove out to the Derby-Lewis's Krugersdorp home on the Monday following the assassination to ask them. I suspected the answer, but it was still a bit of a shock when Clive confirmed that it was.

"Don't worry, Kuba won't say anything," Clive said to me. I had my doubts, but was determined not to say anything to anybody, and to wait and see what happened.

As I later found out, an informant within right-wing circles in Cape Town had provided information which indicated that a man named Keith Darrol had fitted a silencer to such a gun for Clive.

Based on this information and what Waluz had said, the police, after a six-day investigation, managed to link the gun, the silencer, and the list to Clive Derby-Lewis, and arrested him on the evening of April 17, 1993. The police took his and Gaye's computers, as well as a number of personal documents and papers.

I am Arrested

Although Clive was advised by his legal representative not to make any statements, he did make an oral statement to a warrant officer, Beetge, in which he

named four people: myself as the person who had drawn up the list which had been found in Waluz's possession; Faan Venter and Lionel Du Randt (two right-wingers from the West Rand) who had provided the firearm, and Keith Darrol from the Western Cape who had provided the silencer.

Although Clive provided our names to the police, he did stress to Warrant Officer Beetge that none of these people knew anything about the plan to assassinate Hani or anybody else.

Nonetheless, we were all detained by police for questioning along with two more people—Gaye, and Edwin Clarke, a computer engineer friend of the Derby-Lewis's—early in the morning of April 21, 1993. Keith Darrol was detained shortly thereafter.

At first, I said I knew nothing, in accordance with my earlier decision not to say anything. However, the police had seized my computer and printer, and had already shown through forensic analysis that the list found in Janus's apartment had been printed on my printer.

They then showed me Clive's statement, naming me, and his direct statement that I knew nothing of the assassination plot (which was true). Faced with all of that, I then agreed to confirm the accuracy of Clive's statement—that I had provided Gaye with a list of names, as outlined earlier, which I had presumed to be part of the exposé about which we had often talked.

The police seemed perfectly happy with this, and I was told that I would be released shortly and just issued with a subpoena to confirm Clive's statement. Almost as an afterthought, the policeman questioning me asked me if I had told anyone else about the "list." As they had already seen the contents of my computer, and thus had found the story I had written for Gerry Pieterse, I told them I had written a story about the possibility of demonstrations by right-wingers outside ANC and left-wingers' houses, as outlined above.

At the mention of Gerry's name, the policemen who were members of the Security Branch became quite agitated. I began to wonder what was going on. The policemen then told me that Gerry actually worked for the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the state spy agency. I found this claim incredulous, but nonetheless provided them with his contact details. The police then called Gerry, and asked him to come in for questioning. I was not concerned in the slightest, convinced they were barking up the wrong tree. After a few hours, Gerry duly presented himself at the Benoni police station where I was being questioned. As I found out later, he denied outright that he worked for the NIS, claiming that he ran a bona fide wire service which collected stories and disseminated them worldwide to newspapers.

Nothing the police could say or do could convince him to say anything otherwise, and, in the hope that he would break down, they locked us all up that night, Gerry included. I was moved to Kempton Park police station, where I spent an uncomfortable night in a cell shared with a post office robber, a rapist, and a murderer.

In the morning, with Gerry still protesting his innocence, the Security Police, who had had time to think on the matter, then released all of us. I was given notice of a subpoena to appear in court to confirm what Clive had told the police, and then told to go home. To say I was relieved was an understatement.

The police soon realized that Edwin Clarke also had nothing to do with the

whole affair, and released him within hours of his original detention. Gaye was, however, charged with the assassination, along with Clive and Janus.

The Aftereffect and Trial

The assassination of Chris Hani nearly plunged the country into a civil war. Gun sales shot up as nervous whites panicked and bought as many firearms as they could, and on the day of Hani's funeral nearly every major city center in South Africa was ransacked by enraged black mobs.

The trial started with all three charged with conspiracy, murder, and the illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. The state's case against Gaye soon proved to be fairly hopeless. No evidence of any kind linked her to the murder or to the illegal possession of the firearm and ammunition. The only evidence allegedly linking her to the conspiracy charge was the so-called "hit list" which had been found in Janus's apartment.

I testified in court under a subpoena served on me. As agreed, I confirmed the contents of Clive's evidence—that I had drawn up the list and given it to Gaye. Both Gaye and I denied that the list had been drawn with the intention of it being used as a hit list.

Janus, through his legal representative, told the court that he had obtained the list by accident from the Derby-Lewis house after he had removed a newspaper from their filing room which had contained (unbeknownst to himself or the Derby-Lewis's) the list within its pages.

Gaye testified that after she had obtained the list from me, she had put it down in her filing room and had forgotten about it until she had read in the paper that a list had been found in Janus's flat after the assassination. She said that she had then started looking for her list, and was worried when she did not find it.

There was clearly no evidence linking Gaye to any of the charges, and so, not to anyone's surprise, she was found not guilty and discharged. (It later transpired that Clive had taken the list from his wife's files and given it to Janus, but this fact was only to emerge during the 1997 amnesty application of the two men, who admitted that they had lied during the original court case.)

Clive and Janus were acquitted on the conspiracy charges as well. They were, however, found guilty on charges of murder and the illegal possession of the firearm and ammunition. They were sentenced to death on Friday, October 16, 1993, which in reality meant life imprisonment as there has been a moratorium on executions in South Africa since 1990.

Both Janus and Clive applied for amnesty under terms of a new amnesty law created with the introduction of the new constitution in April 1994. The amnesty application was finally heard by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) during the second part of 1997.

Both men fully confessed their role in the assassination, but were denied amnesty primarily because it could not be shown that the Conservative Party had committed itself to an armed struggle—an accurate technicality which allowed the TRC to deny them their freedom, even though in the broad interpretation of the purpose of the law, they most certainly qualified.

The National Intelligence Service Spied On Us

It was during the amnesty application that the truth about Gerry Pieterse was

finally revealed. By then I was living in Britain, and was shocked to hear that he had indeed been working for the National Intelligence Service all along. I had the opportunity to speak to Gerry at a later date, and he revealed that he had actually been given a medal for bravery by the NIS for not breaking down and confessing despite being detained overnight by the Security Police.

Apparently Gerry's job with the NIS was monitoring South African journalists, and then compiling reports on what they were doing. In effect, he acted as a spy service for the state on almost all journalists in South Africa at the time.

The NIS link emerged after a classic mix-up, Gerry later told me. Knowing of the amnesty application and the fact that it would dredge up the fact of his detention, his former boss at NIS had drawn up two statements. One, which was meant for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, denied outright that there was any connection at all between Gerry and the NIS.

The second statement, which was only supposed to go to the NIS internal records, revealed the truth: that Gerry was an NIS operative whose duty it was to spy on journalists inside South Africa.

In a bizarre mix-up, the wrong statement was forwarded to the TRC, which revealed his true job. It was amazing: if the correct statement had been sent, Gerry's role would never have emerged in public. In any event, the truth did emerge, even if it was by accident. An extract from the transcript of the TRC hearing spells it out. Giving evidence, Gaye read the statement which had been handed in by the lawyer representing the Hani family, George Bizos.

"MRS DERBY-LEWIS: (reading document) "Information corresponding to the so-called hit-list found in the flat of Walus was reported to division 052 by agent Z0066 (Jerry Pieterse who fronted as a freelance reporter) who received it from sub-source 46 (Arthur Kemp) who was not aware of his link to NIS through Pieterse, nor was he a registered agent of NIS.

"Pieterse was handled as a principal agent who ran his own network of sub-sources, mainly journalists or stringers for major national and international newspapers. The sub-sources communicated their newspaper type reports to Pieterse by computer."

In one sense, I was deeply angry that Gerry had lied to me about his true activities, and had let the truth be sprung on me in this way. On the other hand, it was almost a relief as by then the conspiracy cranks had already swung into top gear, and one of the myriad of allegations was that I had been working for the NIS.

It was good, therefore, to have it confirmed that I was the one being spied upon, and not the one doing any spying.

I Try to Con the London *Sunday Times*

The revelations of the 1997 amnesty applications dumbfounded me only for a short while. I called up Gaye from Britain to discuss the NIS story, and she and I agreed that now that Clive had been denied amnesty, I should try and make some money out of it.

I manufactured the outline of an utterly bizarre and fantastic story, implicating Thabo Mbeki (then perceived as the ANC "moderate" wing leader), the National Party's FW de Klerk, the police, the Zulus, and whoever else I could think up. I told Gaye about it and my plan to sell this load of nonsense to the media for as much as I

could get, safe in the knowledge that it would easily collapse under its own ridiculousness.

Gaye and I laughed hilariously at the audacity of it, but I still went ahead and called the *Sunday Times* in London, offering them an "exclusive scoop" for only £20,000. They were sorely tempted, and asked me for some type of "evidence" which would prove that I was not trying to rip them off. I had thought of this one, and fed them a "teaser" which I knew would cause a ripple of interest. I told them about the flight to London which I had shared with Philip Powell and Chris Hani—leaving it hanging as if it had somehow been prearranged.

The journalist to whom I spoke nearly burst with excitement at this lead, especially when it was checked out and shown to be true. I thought I was nearly home and dry at taking these stupid journalists and their newspapers for a very expensive ride.

Sadly, after showing initial interest, the *Sunday Times* obviously realized that I was having them on, and refused to pay anything. Disappointed, I called Gaye and told her of the failure of my plan. We both had one final laugh at their idiocy and left it at that.

The Conspiracy Cranks

In an ironic twist, the London *Sunday Times* journalist to whom I had spoken provided the details of our conversation to the *Weekly Mail and Guardian* (hilarious to me, given that that paper's editor had also sold stories to Gerry Pieterse). That paper's overeager and clownish junior reporter, Stefaans Brummer, then published this cock and bull as a major article entitled "Hani's Flight of Coincidence" as part of a series which made all sorts of weird claims of a wider conspiracy.

So it ran: without a shred of evidence, all sorts of nonsense was invented. It was claimed, for example, that the ANC itself had taken away Hani's bodyguards on the day of the assassination, because "they were aware that he was going to be shot."

The absence of Hani's usual bodyguards that day was, however, detailed in the police investigation dossier. In fact, he had been having an affair with an air stewardess and had spent the previous evening in a Johannesburg hotel room with her.

He had given his bodyguards off that weekend in order not to let them in on his affair. In addition, Hani's wife, Limpho, was also away that weekend, allegedly with a paramour of her own in Lesotho, making a mockery of her later claims of a loving family "having been torn apart" by the assassination.

This line of conspiracy having been exhausted, the cranks then turned their attention to Janus himself. The charge was led by one Jan Lamprecht, a right-winger who runs a website from Johannesburg called Africancrisis.org. Lamprecht claimed in a bizarre set of articles that Janus was in fact a Communist "sleeper agent" sent in by the KGB to discredit the South African right wing, and was sitting in jail because of his devotion to the cause of smearing the Conservative Party.

As incredible as this line of thinking was, it became quite a common rumor, with Janus's Polish background being used as "evidence" that he was somehow in league with not only the KGB but the ANC as well.

The theories became increasingly bizarre as time went on. Next thing I knew, I read that there were actually two cars and two gunmen, one being a military backup in case Janus missed. Photographs were produced of the wall next to the shooting scene,

allegedly showing where the second shooter's bullets had hit the plaster (the "bullet holes" were just ordinary plaster chips).

All of this fitted in with the bizarre theory that Hani was killed by a "broader conspiracy" consisting of the "moderate" wing of the ANC and the South African state security services.

The later theory is the one still most favored by extremist leftist cranks, including those in the South African Communist Party. Time and time again, the SACP has called for the reopening of the Hani case to investigate this mythical "broader conspiracy." Although the facts of the case have been dug up repeatedly, no evidence has—unsurprisingly—ever been found to support any such "conspiracy."

Sometimes I was mentioned as the "state security link" (because I had been conscripted into the police, or because of the 1997 NIS revelations) and sometimes I was ignored. Either way, the truth made little difference to the conspiracy cranks.

The Truth is too Boring

The simple truth—that the Chris Hani assassination was the work of Janus Waluz and Clive Derby-Lewis, acting out of what they saw as their duty to prevent an ANC takeover of South Africa, is, it seems, too boring.

Let me assure those who think so, that the truth is anything but boring, even if it is simple. There was no grand conspiracy, no wider net of people involved. Attempts to make it so are based on the most ridiculous presumptions based on quarter-truths and blatant lies.

It seems, however, that there is no end to what people will believe, facts notwithstanding. Hopefully this essay will go some way to laying these mad rumors to rest.

Table of Contents

ESSAY ONE The Lie of Apartheid	6
ESSAY TWO The Myth of Mahatma Gandhi	15
ESSAY THREE The Puzzle of Autogenocide	24
ESSAY FOUR How the Mighty Fall	30
ESSAY FIVE When the River Ran Red	33
ESSAY SIX When the West Looked Away: White Genocide in Zimbabwe	44
ESSAY SEVEN Interviewed by the Flemish	60
ESSAY EIGHT Conspiracies and the Chris Hani Assassination	69